DOKTORI (PHD) ÉRTEKEZÉS

The pragmatic marker - discourse marker dichotomy reconsidered - the case of *well* and *of course*

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Contents

Introduction 5
Preliminaries 5
Structure of the dissertation 6
Part I. Theory 10
Chapter One: Definitions of and approaches to discourse markers 10
1.0 Preliminaries 10
1.1 Definitions and terminology 11
1.1.0 Definitions of discourse, dimensions of discourse analysis 11
1.1.1 Definitions of DMs 13
1.1.2 Terminology 17
1.1.2.0 A brief look at the turmoil 17
1.1.2.1 Markers vs. particles 19
1.1.2.2 The pragmatic marker - discourse marker dichotomy 22
1.2 Methodology and approaches - some unresolved issues 26
1.2.1 Coherence-based models - building taxonomies 26
1.2.2 Minimalist vs. maximalist approaches 32
1.2.2.1 Minimalism vs. maximalism and the multifunctionality of DMs 32
1.2.2.2 Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach 36
1.2.3 Speaker meaning vs. utterance interpretation - social and cognitive perspectives on the pragmatics of DMs 39
1.2.3.1 Sociolinguistic and socio-pragmatic approaches 40
1.2.3.2 Inferential pragmatics - DMs' role in utterance interpretation 46
1.3 Conclusions 49
Chapter Two - Pragmaticalization and the graded category of DMs 50
2.0 Preliminaries 50
2.1 DMs from a diachronic perspective 52
2.2 Characteristics of DMs, criteria for DM status 55
2.2.1 Non-propositionality and optionality 55
2.2.2 Context-dependence 57
2.2.3 Multifunctionality 58
2.2.4 Weak clause association, phonological reduction, variable scope 60
2.2.5 Procedural meaning / non-compositionality 63
2.2.6 High frequency, orality, stigmatization 65
2.3 The outline of a network model of the functional class of DMs 72
2.4 Conclusions 74

Part II. Case studies 75
Introduction to Part II. 75

Chapter Three - Empirical research on *well* 76
3.1 Data and methodology 76

3.2 Functions of *well* based on previous research 78

3.2.1 Early accounts of *well* as a DM: Lakoff (1973) and Svartvik (1980) 78
3.2.2 Schiffrin (1985) and (1987); Schourup (1985) 79
3.2.3 The ethnomethodologist account of *well* 81
3.2.4 Relevance Theoretic accounts of *well* 82
3.2.5 *Well* in narratives 84
3.3 Research procedure, findings 85

3.4 Conclusions, a possible direction for further research 91

Chapter Four - *Of course* does, of course, mark new information - an empirical approach to *of course* 93
4.1 Previous research, functions of *of course* 93

4.2 *Of course* in the Larry King corpus 100

4.3 Conclusions, the status of *of course* as a discourse marker 107

General conclusions, directions for further research 109
References 112
Appendix A Functions of *well* in Schiffrin (1987) 127
Appendix B *Well* in the test corpus 130

List of tables:

table 1.1.1 individual authors' focus on the various properties DMs display 15
table 1.1.2 terms for English DMs by different authors 18
table 1.2.1 taxonomies of coherence relations by three authors, exemplified by DMs 29
table 3.3.1 categories and their contextual cues in the test corpus 86
table 3.3.2. categories for stage 2 of indexing 86
table 3.3.3 functions of *well*, adopted from Fuller 2003a: 42 87
table 3.3.4 contextual cues / co-occurrence patterns in the full corpus 90

List of figures:

figure 2.3 an outline of a network model of the functional class of DMs 73
figure 3.3.1 categorization of tokens of *well* in full corpus, number of occurrences: 1839 89
figure 3.3.2 categorization of tokens of *well* in full corpus, results shown in percentages 89

Introduction

Preliminaries

There is a rapidly growing body of research on linguistic expressions referred to as discourse markers (henceforth DMs), discourse connectives, discourse operators, discourse particles, cue phrases, pragmatic markers, framing devices; the list could go on as the function of the number of theoretical frameworks that have been applied to the study of these items[1]. It is widely agreed that such expressions play a vital role in utterance interpretation. There is, however, disagreement on the type of meaning they express and the criteria one can use to delimit this class of linguistic items.

Discourse markers are intriguing objects of study for several reasons: they promise the researcher ready access to the very fabric of talk-in progress[2], this class of linguistic items also brings up many of the questions concerning the pragmatics/semantics boundary[3]; the differences between speech and writing[4], and the relationship between cohesion and coherence[5]; gender-preferential differentiation[6]; grammaticalisation[7] and a variety of other phenomena that have long fascinated and puzzled linguists (and will most probably continue to do so).

Despite such a rapidly growing body of research on DMs (which has expanded both from an empirical point of view with an increasing number of in-depth analyses of particular items and theoretically, e.g. studies on tendencies in meaning developments, Relevance Theory approaches, etc.) many experts in the field[8] have observed that there are still a number of fundamental questions that need to be answered. Some of the issues include the lack of generally accepted terminologies and classifications, uncertainty regarding essential formal, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics, as well as the absence of a model in which DMs can be related to general linguistic categories in an integrated way.

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[1] Relevance Theory, coherence-based studies, sentence grammar, interactional sociolinguistics, to mention but a few.
[2] cf. Redeker (2005)
[3] cf. e.g. Andersen 2001: 45 or Aijmer 2002: 56
[4] or rather, between planned and unplanned discourse / syntactic vs. pragmatic modes of discourse; cf. section 2.10
[5] cf. Halliday and Hasan (1976).
[6] cf. Holmes (1995).
[7] cf. Hopper and Traugott (1994).
[8] e.g. Schourup:1999, Fraser:1999 or Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen:2004.

The aim of my dissertation is, therefore, to attempt to formulate a coherent approach to the description of the class of expressions I will be referring to as Discourse Markers (Part I), and to show through a series of (corpus-based) case studies (Part II) how individual items cut across the pragmatic marker - discourse marker dichotomy mentioned in the title of my dissertation.

Structure of the dissertation

The structure of my dissertation is as follows. In Chapter One I will review and compare some of the ways DMs have been treated in the literature, keeping in mind the individual researchers' theoretical premises from which they approach DMs and some of the limitations that are inherent in their respective methodologies.

In the first section of Chapter One I will give an overview of the definitions and terminology relevant to delimiting the functional class of DMs. In this section I am going to argue against rigid taxonomies and the conceptual - definitional distinction between pragmatic markers and discourse markers mentioned in the title of the dissertation. My arguments will be based on some of the basic premises of Relevance Theory; I will claim that DMs, being context-dependent by nature, focus on various elements of the communicators' *mutual cognitive environment*, as well as highlight the speaker's *abilities and preferences* that might influence inferential processes on the part of the hearers. In neither of these roles can individual DMs be exclusively associated with and related to either the *context* or the *co-text*, consequently, none of the functions that have been previously described as *textual* can be denied their source in *contextual* premises and vice versa.

In the second section of Chapter One I will be reviewing some of the problem areas that can be identified with regard to DM research, inluding the question of setting up taxonomies, accounting for the multifunctionality of individual DMs as well as their role in interaction and pragmatic processing. After pointing out some of the common denominators and, at the same time, shortcomings of earlier approaches, I am going to advocate a Relevance Theoretic approach to the linguistic phenomena under scrutiny. My arguments will be in part based on Blakemore (2002), in as much as I will claim that (prototypical) DMs encode procedural rather than conceptual meaning. However, Blakemore, on the basis

of the procedural - conceptual distinction argues that there is no class of DMs as there is no single distinguishing criterion for DM status. I draw the opposite conclusion: individual members of the fuzzy category of DMs need not share all or any of the criteria for DM status. Although a whole range of functions individual DMs have been associated with (from the perspective of a variety of theoretical frameworks) can be explained by the principle of relevance and the optimization of relevance, providing a relevance-theoretic account of *all* of the functions DMs can play in inferencing is beyond the scope of the present study. Consequently, I will have recourse to a whole range of principles in the process of discovering the functional spectrum of the DMs *well* and *of course*, a task I will undertake in part II. With a view on the empirical part of my research, therefore, it will be necessary to also review some of the relevant research in the field of conversation analysis, discourse analysis, sociolinguistics etc. in order to account for DM's role in, for instance, turn-taking, pre-sequences, marking uncertainty and story structure, respectively. In addition, while Relevance Theory provides a powerful tool in accounting for the role DMs play in inferencing, there is an escape hatch left open for issues that go beyond the sub-personal and point to the interpersonal aspects of communication in general and DMs in particular. Explaining certain functions of individual DMs on the basis of the second clause of the principle of optimal relevance (the assumption that a given act of communication is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's *abilities* and *preferences*) means lumping together a whole range of social, interpersonal and organizational functions DMs can take[9], functions that go beyond cognitive effects and, as a result, are handled more efficiently within theoretical frameworks that are primarily sociolinguistic and socio-pragmatic in nature.

In Chapter Two of the dissertation I am going to address the issue of categorization and category membership. Describing the characteristics of the functional class of DMs and developing criteria for deciding for every given instance whether it is a DM or not has been a major preoccupation in recent DM research. However, very few attempts have been made to consistently relate such criteria to the diachronic development of individual linguistic items, an object of enquiry that is, naturally, beyond the scope of relevance-theoretic accounts as well.

Scholars who work in the field of DM research usually provide exhaustive lists of the formal, functional and stylistic criteria that are associated with DMs as a functional class (cf. e.g. Schourup 1999, González 2004 and Fraser 1999), still, none of these scholars give a

[9] a generalization Blakemore's (2002) account of *well* is bound to make.

systematic account of the motivation that lies behind the non-propositionality, optionality, context- and genre-dependence, variable scope, etc. of discourse markers. Conversely, scholars who work in the field of grammaticalization-theory give detailed descriptions of the processes of grammaticalization individual DMs go through (cf. e.g. Traugott 1995 and 1997), yet, they fail to address the issue of delimiting the functional class of DMs. Consequently in Chapter Two, after reviewing the criteria that have been identified and relating them to the triggers, processes and results of grammaticalization, I am going to propose a model that treats the functional class of DMs as a *graded category* (along the lines of Lakoff 1987 and Pelyvás 1995) and will also place in the network model some of the linguistic items (e.g. *frankly, in other words, you know*, etc.) whose status as a DM has generated a great deal of controversy. In addressing the issue of categorization, therefore, I am going to combine *grammaticalization theory* and *cognitive grammar*. However, in order to relate the class of DMs to questions of general linguistic interest, I am also going to touch upon some of the *sociolinguistic* aspects of individual (especially stylistic) criteria, in order to dissolve some of the misconceptions with regard to such controversial issues as stigmatization, orality, optionality etc. One of the conclusions I will draw on the basis of the model I propose is, once again, the fact that the *pragmatic marker - discourse marker dichotomy* is dubious, since signalling sequentiality is only one of the (sometimes salient, sometimes secondary) criteria that can be used to model the fuzzy category of DMs.

In Part II of the dissertation I am going to take an empirical approach to the functional spectrum of *well* (Chapter Three) and *of course* (Chapter Four). The selection of these items was motivated by two factors. Firstly, in the literature, the status of neither *well* nor *of course* is clear from the perspective of the PM - DM dichotomy. Secondly, while *well* appears to be in the centre of a lot of DM research, *of course* is usually treated as a peripheral, insignificant member of the (fuzzy) category of DMs. The aim of the second part of my study is, therefore, twofold: by feretting out the functional spectrum of *well* and *of course* I am going to argue that the PM - DM dichotomy is empirically unjustifiable on the one hand; on the other, I am going to provide empirical evidence in favour of putting *well* and *of course* in their respective places in the network model I propose in Chapter Two.

From the above summary one might get the impression that instead of formulating a coherent approach to the description of DMs I will perpetuate or even further enhance the methodological turmoil that has recently surrounded the study of DMs. However, I will hopefully demonstrate that the different frameworks (*Relevance Theory, grammaticalization*

theory, *cognitive semantics*) I will be using in an attempt to account for different aspects of the functional class of DMs constitute appropriate complementary frameworks for my analysis.

Part I. Theory

Chapter One: Definitions of and approaches to discourse markers

1.0 Preliminaries

The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of some of the ways DMs have been defined and some of the distinctions that have been made to delineate the functional class of DMs and to distinguish it from other categories. Such distinctions include *propositional vs. non-propositional meaning, inherent vs. contextual meaning, pragmatic markers vs. discourse markers*.

In section 1.1.1 (on operational and theoretical definitions) I am going to argue that by concentrating on one or two of the above distinctions and by viewing them as dichotomies rather than *continua*, researchers often miss generalizations about the functions of individual DMs on the one hand and exclude linguistic items from the functional class of DMs without providing a principled basis for doing so. Accordingly, I am going to argue that the problematic status of some of the DMs is due to the *diachronic grammaticalisation processes* that are synchronically manifested in the use of DMs, processes that result in continua between uses that are non-propositional, context-dependent, omissible, etc. and those that are not. Section 1.1.1 will only provide a first approximation to the claim that DMs constitute a *graded category*, an issue which I will explore in later chapters.

After summarizing individual researchers' focus with regard to defining the category of DMs, I am going to formulate my own definition along the lines of a *relevance-theoretic* approach advocated by Blakemore (2002). Blakemore uses the RT approach to claim that there is no class of DMs as there is no single distinguishing criterion for DM status. While accepting her premise that no such criterion exist, I draw the opposite conclusion: individual members of the fuzzy category of DMs need not share all or any of the criteria for DM status.

In section 1.2 (methodology and approaches) I am going to further elaborate on the theoretical premises of coherence-based models and semantic-maximalist approaches to DMs and contrast them with the *relevance-theoretic* approach I take in the present study. With a view on the empirical research I am going to present in Part II of my dissertation, I am also going to review the significant contribution that scholars working in the field of *sociolinguistics* have made to the study of DMs in terms of mapping the functional spectrum of individual items.

1.1 Definitions and terminology

1.1.0 Definitions of discourse, dimensions of discourse analysis

Before I discuss the various approaches individual scholars take to the phenomenon of DMs, it is necessary to define the notion of discourse itself. Although mapping the multidimensional field of discourse analysis is beyond the scope of the present study, it is appropriate to mention some of the choices scholars have to make before they embark on their individual analyses.

There are three sets of dimensions[10] along which the complex field of discourse analysis is traditionally[11] carved up, three types of commitment that determine an individual scholar's approach as well as his/her theoretical premises: dimensions by *data* (written vs. spoken, planned vs. unplanned); dimensions by *theory* (formal vs. functional approaches) and dimensions by *scope* and *focus* (discourse as product vs. discourse as process).

With regard to the second dimension, discourse is either defined as "language above the sentence" (formalist approach initiated by Harris:1951) or "language use / social action" (functionalist approach that goes back to Malinowski's 1930 concept of phatic communication). Accordingly, DMs are either defined as markers of structural relations between sentences (*structural units*) or as markers that indicate relations between speech acts and speech events (*units of behaviour*). In either case, the ultimate aim appears to be to set up taxonomies that represent relations between units of discourse (defined conversely as sentences or acts) in terms of stucture and function, respectively.

In the present study, however, I am going to take a third approach[12] along the lines of Relevance Theory (as described in, inter alia, Sperber and Wilson 1986) and will define discourse as a derivative concept, the result of the process whereby context is built up, where context is defined in terms of the *mutual cognitive environment* created by the communicators who take part in the (verbal) interaction. Such an approach presumes that discourse relations are merely side-effects of inferential processes. Identifying such relations and setting up taxonomies, therefore, should not be the primary focus of interest. A cognitive, sub-personal

[10] For an overview of the three dimensions cf. Csölle 1999: chapter 1.
[11] Cf. e.g. Schiffrin (1994), Coulthard (1985) and Brown&Yule (1983).
[12] By Schiffrin's (1994) logic, Relevance Theory might be viewed as a formalist approach, Blakemore (2002), however, argues that the approach represented RT cuts-across the formalis-functionalist distinction.

approach to discourse also ensures that communication i.e. the creation and the adjustment of communicators' mutual cognitive environment is viewed as a *dynamic process*. As a result, there is a strong commitment to view communication (and, as a result, discourse) as *process* rather than product (cf. dimension by scope and focus mentioned above).

As far as dimensions by data are concerned, it is easy to demonstrate that an individual scholar's choice of either spoken or written (planned and unplanned) discourse will also affect the approach (s)he will take to DMs. One only needs to take a look at the lists of DMs selected by individual authors to be able to identify the focus and the limitations a particular approach to DMs will have. Compare, for example, the lists of DMs given by Fraser (1990) and Schiffrin (1987), respectively:

> consequently, also, above all, again, anyway, alright, alternatively, besides, conversely, in other words, in any event, meanwhile, more precisely, nevertheless, next, otherwise, similarly, or, and, equally, finally, in that case, in the meantime, incidentally, OK, listen, look, on the one hand, that said, to conclude, to return to my point, while I have you (Fraser 1990)

> oh, well, but, and, or, so, because, now, then, I mean, y'know, see, look, listen, here, there, why, gosh, boy, this is the point, what I mean is, anyway, whatever (Schiffrin 1987)

Relevance Theory provides a powerful tool for accounting for both written and spoken markers and has been applied to the description of linguistic items as diverse as *well*, *I mean*, *however, nevertheless,* etc[13].

Accordingly, in what follows I am going to give a brief overview of the various approaches to the study of DMs with reference to the above dimensions. Subsequently, by formulating my own definition I will necessarily make commitments about the way I view discourse in general and DMs in particular.

[13] cf. e.g. Blakemore 2002 and Fuller 2003a.

1.1.1 Definitions of DMs

Most scholars working within the so-called Anglo-American discourse marker tradition[14] share the functionalist commitment (cf. *dimension two* mentioned above). Many of them include programmatic statements in their analyses of DMs to the effect that discourse is defined as *language use* anchored in *social context* and that *coherence* (and setting up taxonomies of coherence relations) is central to the study of discourse. From their perspective DMs are alternately defined as "markers of discourse transitions"; "linguistic items that structure discourse"[15]; expressions that "facilitate the process of interpreting coherence relations"[16] and "signal a sequential relationship" between units of discourse[17].

The reason why individual scholars differ with regard to the inclusion and exculsion of particular linguistic items in the category of DMs as well as to the subcategorization of the items they decide to include, therefore, lies elsewhere. In addition to their conflicting views on what should constitute data for discourse analysis (cf. *dimension one* above), they also disagree about whether or not DMs may add *truth-conditional* content, have *inherent meaning* and whether items that relate their host unit to the context rather than the previous utterance should be excluded.

As a result, some of the definitions are remarkably more exclusive than others. Fraser (1990), for example, defines DMs as items that indicate "a sequential relationship between the current basic message and the previous discourse" and includes uses of *well* in turn-initial position (1.1.1.1), whereas exludes *well* turn-internally, when used as a "pause-marker" (1.1.1.2):

1.1.1.1 A: I want another candy. B: *Well*, there are six left.

1.1.1.2 A: I want another candy. B: There are ... *well* ..., six left.

[14] cf. Östman 1981, 1982; Schourup 1985; Schiffrin 1987; Stenström 1990; Fraser 1990&1996, Redeker 1990, 1991 and 2005.
[15] Redeker 2005:4
[16] Risselada and Spooren 1998:132
[17] Fraser 1990: 383

In addition to excluding items on grounds of position and intonation, Fraser also excludes all items that can be associated with truth-conditional meaning.

Redeker (1990, 1991, 2005), on the other hand, takes an extremely inclusive approach and defines DMs[18] as expressions that are used "with the primary function of bringing to the listener's attention a particular kind of relation between the discourse unit it introduces and the immediate discourse context" (2005:3). In her definition the nature of the discourse context is unspecified, the class of DMs, therefore includes items exemplified in 1.1.1.3 through 1.1.1.5, uses that Fraser would label as pragmatic markers rather than DMs:

1.1.1.3 A: Harry is old enough to drink. B: *Frankly*, I don't think he should.
1.1.1.4. I want a drink tonight. *Obviously*, I'm old enough.
1.1.1.5. A: We should leave fairly soon now. B: *Stupidly*, I lost the key so we can't.

In addition, Redeker does not take a firm stand on excluding items that have propositional content, in fact, she sets up a category of *ideational markers* of discourse relations, which includes temporal adverbials (*then, after that*), conjunctive uses of *and* and *but* as well as a whole range of other items with propositional content.

Probably the most influential (at least the most frequently quoted) definition was proposed by Schiffrin (1987), who concentrates on DMs' role in "providing contextual coordinates for ongoing talk" (p312) and defines them as "sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk" (p31)[19]. Schiffrin's approach is also in stark contrast with Fraser's exclusiveness, in that she also includes non-verbal devices (gestures, gaze etc.), in addition to markers that function on the ideational plane and have truth-conditional meaning (*and, because, so*).

In addition to the three most influential figures in DM research, there is a great number of scholars who, likewise, attribute different degrees of importance to individual properties DMs display (non-propositionality, context-dependence, sequentiality, etc.). Table 1.1.1 summarizes some of the characteristics of DMs that individual scholars include in their respective definitions. It is important to note, that, even if not included in the definitions, certain properties (e.g. syntactic diversity, context-dependence) are,

[18] She happens to call them *discourse operators*.
[19] She defines DMs both in "theoretical" and in "operational" terms, the first quote is taken from the former, the second from the latter definition.

nevertheless, acknowledged by all scholars. There are, however, properties, such as orality and attitude-marking that divide researchers into two camps, a number of scholars regard them as essential from the perspective of delineating the class of DMs, while others exclude them or consider them irrelevant. In the former case I marked the appropriate box with a bracketed (x) to indicate that such properties are part of the individual scholar's assumptions about the role of DMs, even if (s)he does not include them in his / her definition.

	seq.	context	oral.	synt.	proced.	poly-func.	attitude	scope	non-prop.	inv.
Schiffrin 1987	x	x	x	x			(x)			
Fraser 1990 and 1999	x	x		x	x				x	
Redeker 1990 & 1991	x	x					(x)			
Stenström 1994	x		(x)							
Kroon 1995	x	x								x
Knott and Sanders 1998	x									
Andersen 1998	x		x				x			
Hansen 1998a	x		(x)				(x)	x	x	
Risselada and Spooren 1998	x			x						
Romaine and Lange 1998	x		(x)				(x)			
Blakemore 1987&2002					x					
González 2004					x	x	x			

Legend:
seq. - sequentiality-coherence-connectivity
context - context-dependence - context-coordination
oral. - orality
synt. - syntactic diversity
proced. - procedural meaning
poly-funct. - poly-functionality
attitude - marking attitudes
scope - variable scope
non-prop. - non-propositional content
inv. - invariable form

table 1.1.1 individual authors' focus on the various properties DMs display

In addition to the "standard" definitions along the lines of Schiffrin (1987), Redeker (1990) and Fraser (1999), descibed above, there are three additional perspectives that are worth mentioning at this point. The first is the interactional perspective, represented by e.g.

Stenström (1994), who[20] defines DMs as "turn-organizers" and "turn-holders" (p63). Aijmer (2002), on the other hand, provides a negative (and as a result somewhat broad) definition, describing DMs as "elements that do not belong to any other part of speech" (p16).

The third definition that is in contrast with mainstream Anglo-American DM research is provided by Blakemore (1987), who treats DMs[21] as "semantic constraints on relevance". Blakemore (2002), on the other hand, claims that there is no class of DMs as there is no single distinguishing criterion for DM status. In section 1.2.3.2 I am going to elaborate on the relevance-theoretic approach to DMs as well as describe the role of DMs in inferencing and the optimization of relevance. As far as the lack of a single distinguishing criterion is concerned, in Chapter Two I am going to argue that DMs do form a functional class of items, individual members of which need not share some of the characteristics of the class as a whole.

Consequently, in light of the distinctions made by the above mentioned scholars in their respective definitions, and on the basis of my arguments in section 1.2.3 and Chapter Two, I define DMs as follows. DMs constitute a *graded category* that draws on *syntactically diverse* linguistic items used for a variety of *metacommunicative* functions. Members of the class have undergone or are undergoing a process of *pragmaticalization* as a result of which they form a heterogenous group with regard to continua along the dimensions of *propositional - non-propositional, context-independent - context-dependent, inherent - implicational, conceptual - procedural meaning*.

[20] (following in the footsteps of Sinclair and Coulthard and the Birmingham school of discourse analysis as well as conversation analysis)
[21] Blakemore (1987) deals with a sub-group of DMs she calls discourse connectives.

1.1.2 Terminology

In the previous section I outlined some of the properties DMs display and provided a preliminary definition of DMs as a functional class. I also identified some of problem areas in the field of DM research (propositionality, taxonomies, context-dependence, etc.) that will be elaborated on in the following chapters. However, the very term *discourse marker* raises a whole range of controversial issues that need to be mentioned before I move on to stating my arguments in terms of DMs as a functional class and the question of category membership. In this section, therefore, I am going to take a brief look at the terminological turmoil (1.1.2.0), then justify my choice of the term *discourse marker* (1.1.2.1), and finally provide a first approximation to why I consider the *discourse marker - pragmatic marker* distinction problematic (1.1.2.2).

1.1.2.0 A brief look at the turmoil

One of the symptoms of the uncertainties around the syntactic and pragmatic status of DMs is the fact that there are almost as many expressions denoting linguistic units that belong to this category as there are approaches to pragmatic, interpersonal, attitudinal, etc. uses of language. The theoretical premises from which DMs have been approached have often been very different, which, in a majority of cases, accounts for the profusion of terms used to refer to the same linguistic item used in rather similar linguistic and non-linguistic contexts. Thus *well* in example 1.1.2 would be alternately labelled as a *discourse connective*, *discourse operator*, *discourse particle*, *cue phrase*, *pragmatic marker*, *pragmatic force modifier*, *pragmatic expression* by proponents of Relevance Theory, Rhetorical Structure Theory, Speech Act Theory, Close Discourse Analysis etc. respectively:

1.1.2 A. Was he a good writer?

B. *Well*, it is a little hard to tell.

In 1.1.2 speaker B is asked a direct question and in order to *cue* his listener / to *mark* that his response is not going to be straight-forward, he uses the *particle* "well", whereby he modifies the *illocutionary force* of his utterance and *connects* his communicative act to the previous one. A speaker can be considered to do all of the above, the question is whether an individual scholar concentrates on the *interaction* (s)he is engaged in, the *discourse* (s)he is supposedly building, the *social act* (s)he is performing or the *cognitive processes* underlying the interaction. The resulting terminological turmoil is illustrated in table 1.1.2, which provides a summary of some of the terms whose extension is often one and the same linguistic item: the DM *well, of course, oh,* etc.:

	well	**of course**	**oh**	**ah**	**now**	**I mean**	**but**	**you know**
Schourup '85	DP	-	DP	DP	DP	DP	-	DP
Schiffrin '87	DM	-	DM	-	DM	DM	DM	DM
Erman '87	PE	-	-	-	-	PE	-	PE
Fraser '90 and '99	DM / pause marker*	DM	int / pause marker	pause marker	DM	'90-PM '99-DM	DM	PM
James '74	int	-	int	int	-	-	-	-
Wierzbicka '91	-	-	int	int	-	-	-	-
Hirschberg and Litman '93	cue	-	-	-	cue	-	cue	-
Stenström '94	DM/IS*	-	IS	-	DM/IS*	IS	-	DM/IS*
Holmes '95	PP	PP	-	-	-	PP	-	PP
Kroon '95	DP	-	-	-	-	DP	DP	DP
Nikula '96	PFM	PFM	-	-	-	PFM	-	PFM
Fuller 2003b	DM	DM	DM	-	-	DM	-	DM

Legend:
DP - discourse particle
DM - discourse marker
PE - pragmatic expression
PM - pragmatic marker
int - interjection
cue - cue word / cue phrase
IS - interactional signal
PP - pragmatic particle
PFM - pragmatic force modifier
* - categorized according to the position / slot they take in the utterance

table 1.1.2 terms for English DMs by different authors

1.1.2.1 Markers vs. particles

In order to avoid enhancing the turminological turmoil illustrated in the previous section, rather than coining a new term that would best reflect my own theoretical premises and perspectives on DMs, I have decided to use the label *discourse marker* - a term that has already been widely (if not efficiently) applied. There are two reasons I prefer the term *discourse marker* to any other expression that is in use in reference to the class of linguistic phenomena I will be discussing in my paper; first of all it is considered to be the most frequently used, theory-neutral term, and, as a result, it has acquired a narrower and more precisely specifiable reference than either *discourse particle*, or *pragmatic marker* (also referred to as *pragmatic particle*). Secondly, the term *discourse marker* is the least problematic of the three most frequent terms, which I will illustrate in the following by taking each of them in turn.

A close second in frequency of occurrence according to Schourup (1999) is the term *discourse particle* (DP), which predominated until the mid 1980s. However, *DP* may be regarded as a problematic label for three reasons. Firstly, 'particle' has traditionally been a syntactic term, whereas DMs are more often regarded as comprising a functional class that is syntactically heterogenous (cf. chapter two) and is best defined and characterised in *semantic-pragmatic* terms.

Secondly, even when *DP* is intended as a syntactic label, its meaning is rather imprecise and carries a range of connotations that are incommensurable with the category of DMs. Consider the definition of particles in the Dictionary of Language and Languages compiled by David Crystal:

> **particle** An invariable item with a grammatical function. The term is especially used for a form which does not readily fit into a standard classification of parts of speech. The *to* in front of an English infinitive *(to see)* is often described as a particle, as is French *y* in such forms as *Il y a* `There is/are'. (Crystal 1994: 291)

Schourup (1999) observes that ‘particle’ is sometimes used to refer to elements of those traditional word classes that are uninflected (‘invariable’), such as conjunctions, prepositions, interjections, and adverbs; at other times it is applied to all invariables except adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions (see also Hartmann, 1993: 2953). However, because of the fact that, as Crystal's above definition suggests, particles are usually defined negatively, the label ‘particle’ is usually applied to items that do not fit easily into *any* well-established word class. Zwicky also points out that ‘particle’ is commonly used to identify items that have idiosyncratic distributions and peculiar semantics (1985: 292).

The third issue with 'particle' as a label for the linguistic phenomenon under scrutiny is the competing use of this term to refer specifically to scalar and modal particles and other linguistic items that are usually treated in the German 'Partikelforschung tradition', including *aber, allerdings, auch, blof, denn, doch, eben, eigentlich, freilich, halt, ja, mal, nur, schon, tiberhaupt* and *wohl* , which Abraham lists as pragmatic particles in German (1991: l).

Neither the category DP, in this more restrictive sense, nor the classes of scalar and modal particles individually are coextensive with the DM category as typically described. Even though Aijmer (1994) labels *I think* an "English modal particle", Hansen observes that modal particles are syntactically integrated into the clause and are, therefore, non-existent in English (1998a: 43). As we will see in chapter two, syntactic independence / weak clause association, in fact, constitutes one of the most salient characteristics of DMs.

As far as the referential difference between DP and DM is concerned, this, too, is partly related to the indeterminate use of the term particle. Owing to this indeterminacy, the label DP tends to be more inclusive than the term DM[22]. The greater inclusiveness is seen as early as the 80s in the use of this term by Levinson to refer to *all right* (1983: 163), by Schourup to refer to approximative *like* (1985: 62), and by Wierzbicka to refer to *even* (1986b: 519). More recently, the term DP is used by Fischer and most of the scholars who adhere to her programmatic approach to DM research (cf. Fischer 2005). While I advocate her idea that the DM (in her terms DP) category should include not only prototypical DMs as listed by Fraser 1990 and 1999 but also items (frequently treated as interjections) such as utterance-internal *well* and *you know*, Fischer's inclusion of freestanding interjections like

[22] From a formal, rather than a functional point of view.

ouch! and response words like *mhm* and *no* I find a bit more difficult to justify from either a theoretical or an empirical standpoint (cf. Fischer 2000: 112).

In sum, besides having more inclusive reference, the term *discourse particle*, as a result of the connotation of its component term "particle", tends to be used in a more tentative and pretheoretical way than the term *discourse marker* and is frequently used without definition. *Discourse Particle*, therefore is a term that confers "tentative grammatical status on a particular set of invariable items as a matter of convenience" (Schourup 1999: 229).

It is also important to note at this point that the term *discourse particle* usually carries an assumption that the linguistic items in question are to be considered a *formally* distinct word category rather than a linguistic *function* that can be fulfilled by many forms of linguistic items such as single words, verb phrases and speech formulas. DMs constitute a functional rather than a former category, therefore, the label *discourse marker*[23] conveys their syntactic heterogeneity more appropriately.

[23] There is an alternative, even broader interpretation of the term 'discourse marker', according to which all formulaic expression that have discourse functions are to be included. Wharry (2003), for examle, examines discourse marker functions of "sermonic expressions frequent in performed African American sermons" (e.g. *Amen, Hallelujah, Praise God*) and refers to such expressions as DMs.

1.1.2.2 The pragmatic marker - discourse marker dichotomy

As we saw in the previous section, although the term *DM* has a narrower range of reference, it has been subject to more precise attempts at definition. Despite such attempts, there is still a lot of uncertainty and inconsistency around the use of the term, including the relationship between the label *DM* and the term *pragmatic marker*, a question raised in the title of my dissertation.

We can observe two opposing views in the literature with regard to the distinction between the labels *pragmatic marker* and *discourse marker*. Fraser considers 'discourse marker' as a subtype of pragmatic markers, specifically "an expression which signals the relationship of the basic message to the foregoing discourse" (1996: 186; see also Fraser 1998). Fraser's categorization is reflected in recent accounts as well, Erman (2001), for instance, states that "the most important function of pragmatic markers as textual monitors is that of organising discourse" and creating coherence (p1340).

At the other extreme, we find Redeker's paradigmatic approach to DMs. She considers PMs a subtype of DMs and differentiates between *semantic discourse markers* and *pragmatic discourse markers*; the former, according to Redeker, are markers of ideational structure, while the latter are markers of pragmatic structure. Redeker's subdivision is also perpetuated in more recent accounts; González, for example deals with discourse markers found in the "pragmatic structure" of English and Catalan narratives and calls these items "pragmatic markers" (González 2004: 62). The dubious status of "markers of ideational structure" within the category of DMs has, first of all, to do with the fact that one of the most salient characteristics of DMs is their non-propositionality[24] (see section 2.1).

Besides such differences in individual scholars' respective taxonomies (an issue I am going to take up in section 1.2.1) there are additional reasons to reconsider the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dichotomy.

[24] As I have already argued, DMs form a graded category. Redeker, however does not distinguish between core and peripheral members, what is more, she includes items such as *then*, *that* and *whose* as salient members in her taxonomy of DMs.

As I mentioned in section 1.1.1, Fraser (1990) exludes utterance-internal tokens of *well*, because they do not signal a two-place relationship between two discourse segments. Thus, according to him, *well* is a discourse marker in example 1.1.2.2.1, whereas in 1.1.2.2.2 it is a pragmatic marker.

1.1.2.2.1 A: I want another candy. B: *Well,* there are six left.

1.1.2.2.2 A: I want another candy. B: There are ... *well* ..., six left.

What is more, Fraser (1999) also exludes segment-initial tokens of *well*, which "signal a comment, a separate message, that relates to the following segment". Following Fraser's logic, *well* in 1.1.2.2.3 and 1.1.2.2.4 is a PM (pause marker), whereas in 1.1.2.2.5 it is a DM:

1.1.2.2.3 What am I going to do now? **Well ...** I really don't know.

1.1.2.2.4 A. What are you going to do now? B. **Well ...** I really don't know.

1.1.2.2.5 A. What are you going to do now? B. **Well,** I'm moving out.

What Fraser's account fails to realize is that the ("two-placed") relationship holds between two *contextual assumptions* salient in the speaker's and hearer's *mutual cognitive environment*, rather than between two *discourse segments*. Thus, a DM might mark a relationship between the host unit in which it occurs and an assumption (thought) attributed to someone else (exemplified by 1.1.2.2.6), or between a host unit and (a mental representation of) a non-linguistic situational factor (as in 1.1.2.2.7):

1.1.2.2.6 B. (noticing the expression on A's face) *So*, you hate me now.

1.1.2.2.7 B. (A arrives with a bag full of groceries) *So*, you've spent all your money[25].

[25] example borrowed from Blakemore (1987: 106).

The reason I used the DM *so* in the two examples above is that *so* represents a salient member of the functional class of DMs in Fraser's model, an item that always signals "a two-placed relationship" between discourse segments, and, as a result, atypical uses cannot be explained away by making reference to marking pauses, signalling comments, etc.

Notice that in the above argument I made reference to the relevance-theoretic notions of *contextual assumptions* and *mutual cognitive environment* (terms borrowed from RT), at the same time, I used coherence-oriented concepts such as *connection* and *segment*. Blakemore (2002) represents a more radical approach to DMs and claims that we should abandon the idea that DMs mark connections in discourse altogether (p5), whether these are connections between discourse segments, between the propositions or between social acts (cf. dimension by theory - structuralism vs. functionalism in section 1.1.0). Blakemore also claims that discourse "is an artifact with no psychological reality", and that coherence is a property of that artifact (ibid.).

While I strongly agree with Blakemore's claim that discourse is a by-product of communicators' efforts to achieve *optimal relevance*, I still consider it a legitimate object of inquiry. However, as illustrated by examples 1.1.2.2.3 through 1.1.2.2.7, DMs are best conceptualized as signalling relationships between contextual assumptions and premises[26], rather than discourse segments. Such assumptions can be based either on the co-text (as in example 1.1.2.2.1) or the context (as in example 1.1.2.2.6). Since assumptions based on contextual and co-textual effects are at constant interplay, at times strengthening and confirming, at other times weakening and cancelling each other, markers that signal relationships between them can neither be exclusively labelled as *pragmatic* (i.e. context-dependent) *markers* nor as *discourse* (i.e. co-text dependent) *markers*.

Another reason I refrain from perpetuating the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dichotomy is that one of the most basic characteristics of the linguistic items under scrutiny is their multifunctionality, thus a single occurrence of a given marker (when considered in context) can simultaneously signal discourse relations and the speaker's attitudes, face considerations, etc. Thus *well* in example 1.1.2.2.5 above, in addition to marking relationships between two discourse segments (co-textual assumptions) might also mark B's consideration of A's face, unwillingness to give a straigh-forward answer, etc.

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[26] i.e. mental representations constructed on the basis of text, context, and inferences from both, cf. Blakemore 1987:106

In this section I argued that the dubious status of the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dichotomy stems from individual authors' conflicting subcategorization conventions (and the resulting taxonomies) as well as uncertainties regarding the nature and definition of what constitutes the context of the host unit in which a given DM occurs. I argued that context should be defined along the lines of Relevance Theory, in terms of participants' *mutual cognitive environment*, and discourse should be viewed as a by-product of communicators' efforts to aim at optimal relevance. I also pointed out the fact that the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dichotomy is unjustifiable from an empirical perspective as well (a point that corpus-based examples will further illustrate in Part II), since, in the majority of cases, actual uses of DMs in naturally-occurring discourse simultaneously fulfill a variety of functions, *pragmatic* (e.g. marking attitudes, certainty, face considerations, etc.) and *discourse* (e.g. sequencing, marking story structure, etc.) functions alike.

1.2 Methodology and approaches - some unresolved issues

1.2.1 Coherence-based models - building taxonomies

In the previous section I argued that no straightforward distinction can be made between discourse markers and pragmatic markers, as individual, naturally-occurring tokens frequently cut across the two categories. I also hinted at the fact that this phenomenon is not reflected in taxonomies set up by authors whose primary aim is to subcatogorize the functional class of DMs. Taking a relevance-theoretic perspective, I argued that coherence is most appropriately viewed as a by-product of communicators' efforts to make their contributions optimally relevant. In this section, I am going to take a closer look at some of the taxonomies that have been suggested by representatives of the Anglo-American discourse marker tradition. After reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the "taxonomy approach", I am going to argue that setting up such models is a futile attempt for two reasons. Firstly, I am going to reiterate the arguments I made in the previous section with regard to a relevance-theoretic approach to discourse. Secondly, I am going to present some of the findings that have been contributed to DM research by proponents of grammaticalization theory (e.g. Traugott 1995, Lehmann 1995) to illustrate that individual markers are unlikely to be in complementary distribution.

It would be safe to say that over the last eighteen years no book or article has been written on DMs that did not make reference to Schiffrin's 1987 book entitled *Discourse Markers*[27]. Schiffrin's work was pioneering in that she demonstrated how a set of DMs (*oh*, *well*, *now*, *then*, *you know*, *I mean*, *so*, *because*, *and*, *but*, and *or*) perform important functions in conversation and call for systematic and rigorous analysis. Schiffrin's approach is interdisciplinary[28], within linguistics and sociology, and demonstrates that markers and the conversations in which they function can only be properly understood as an integration of structural, semantic, pragmatic, and social factors. Schiffrin collected data for her analysis during sociolinguistic fieldwork; the individual DMs she put under scrutiny occurred in sociolinguistic interviews. The study raises a wide range of theoretical and methodological

[27]Yong-Yae Park for example, observes that "Schiffrin represents perhaps the most extensive research to date on discourse markers" (1998:279).

[28] Taking a multidisciplinary concept of discourse analysis as a starting point.

issues, however, because the search for an adequate model of discourse constitutes a central theme in the book, her study is frequently labelled as a "coherence-based approach".

Schiffrin views conversation as a multilayered interaction, consisting of five planes of talk, namely an *exchange structure*, an *action structure*, an *ideational structure*, a *participation framework*, and an *information state*, each of which is connected to the others and all of which contribute to the conversational procedure[29]:

1. The exchange structure, which consists of units of talk organized in turns or adjacency-pairs (e.g. questions and answers, greetings). Schiffrin borrowed this concept from ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. The reason she includes exchange structure in her model is to capture the fact that participants establish and define the alternation of sequential roles. An exchange structure is critical in fulfilling what Goffman (1981:14-15) calls the "system constraints" of talk. The units (turns and adjacency pairs) are not linguistic per se; they are realized by the use of language.
2. The action structure, which refers to speech act structure. This component captures the interpersonal function of conversation. It corresponds to Goffman's notion of "ritual constraints" (1981:21) and defines the speakers' identity and social situation, the type of action taking place, the one at which participants intend to arrive and what they actually get to. As in the structure type, speakers and hearers negotiate their organization. Similarly, the units are not linguistic per se, they are realized by the use of language.
3. The ideational structure, which includes propositions that carry semantic content, ideas and the different relationships that can be established between them for a satisfactory discourse organization. Thus, in contrast to exchange and action structures (which, according to Schiffrin, are pragmatic because of the role which speakers and hearers play in negotiating their organization), the units within this structure are semantic and propositional (therefore linguistic). The relations within this structure are cohesive, topical and functional.
4. The participation framework, which refers to the different types of relations that a speaker and a hearer can set up and the way they are related to their propositions, acts and turns. As with exchange and action structures, participation framework relates

[29] Schiffrin 1987:24ff

language to its users. As a result, participation frameworks are also pragmatic because they involve speakers' relations to each other and to what is being said, meant, and done.

5. The information state, which is related to the cognitive capacity of the participants, how they organize their knowledge and what they know or assume they know of their shared knowledge. Since not all the information flowing between both participants is relevant, this level involves an internal inferential process they have to go through.

Schiffrin claims that a process of integration of all these discourse components is needed in order to make communication successful, and DMs are prominently active in this process: they have "a function within the overall integration of discourse as a system" (1987:313).

In her analysis of the individual DMs Schiffrin points out that they create *contextual coordinates* (i.e. deictic centers of the utterance) that indicate for the hearer how an utterance is to be interpreted. For example, *oh* is functional at the level of informational state as it marks a speaker's shift of focus (e.g. in the case of repairs, answers, or acknowledgement of information), while *well* is a response marker whose function is to signal that "the options offered through a prior utterance for the coherence of an upcoming response are not precisely followed" (p. 127). The difference between *oh* and *well* is thus that the former item marks responses at a *cognitive level* (information state) whereas the latter marks responses at an *interactional level* (the level of the participation framework).

According to Schiffrin, all discourse markers have a *primary function*; i.e. they signal discourse structure on one of the five planes of talk. In addition, all of them can have a *secondary function*, signaling a different kind of structure on at least one other plane of talk, but might function on all 5 planes at once (p320).

As is clear from the above, Schiffrin's model attempts to handle the multifunctionality of DMs with reference to different planes of talk, while the distribution/interchangeability and/or complementary function of individual DMs is explained in terms of their primary and secondary functions.

Schiffrin's taxonomy provides a convenient starting point for followers of the Anglo-American discourse marker tradition, whose primary concern is to create models of discourse. Redeker (1990, 1991), for example, identifies three instead of five components that contribute to textual coherence: *ideational structure*, which expresses relations in the

world the discourse describes, such as temporal sequence, causal relations, etc., *rhetorical structure*, which conveys the speaker's illocutionary intentions, and *sequential structure*, which expresses the paratactic and/or hypotactic relations between loosely adjacent discourse segments. She calls items which indicate to the hearer that a shift between the different discourse structures is taking place *discourse operators* and describes their primary function as "bringing to the listener's attention a particular kind of linkage of the upcoming utterance with the immediate discourse context" (1991:1168).

Fraser (1988) and (1996) distinguishes between three different types of discourse markers, namely *discourse topic markers* (by the way, y'see), which signal what the speaker is talking about, *discourse activity markers* (admittedly, after all), which have a function of clarifying, conceding, explaining, etc. various discourse activities, and *message relationship markers* (however, in addition) which indicate whether the messages are parallel, contrastive, etc.

Table 1.2.1 summarizes the three authors' respective taxonomies of discourse coherence relations:

	Discourse Coherence Relations				
	Semantic rel.	Pragmatic relations			
	Ideational	Interactional		Textual	Inferential
Schiffrin '87	Ideational structure *and, but, or so*	Action structure **well, *and, *but*	Participation framework *well, I mean*	Exchange structure**well, *and, *but*	Information state *oh, you know*
Redeker '90 and '91	Ideational structure *then, after that*	Rhetorical structure *well, you know*		Sequential structure *but, so*	
Fraser '88 and '93		discourse activity markers *admittedly, after all*		discourse topic markers *by the way, you see*- message relationship markers *but, despite, however*	

* secondary functions

table 1.2.1 taxonomies of coherence relations by three authors, exemplified by DMs

The table illustrates the stark contrasts one can observe in terms of both subcategorization and inclusion of respective items that represent the corresponding categories. This lack of concensus both about the function of individual DMs, and about exactly which items should be included in the class of markers has led many researchers to

conclude that attempting an exhaustive taxonomy is *premature*[30]. In my view, however, individual DMs will *always* elude discourse analysts' attempts to put them into functional straitjackets.

One of the reasons for this elusiveness is the very fact that, as already mentioned, DMs show a remarkable degree of multifunctionality both as linguistic items and as individual tokens in naturally-occurring discourse. As we saw above, scholars usually account for the former by making reference to different planes of discourse. The fact that a particular instance of a given DM can also simultaneously fulfill a whole range of functions (cf. section 1.1.2.2), however, does not fit nicely into models of discourse coherence.

A second caveat that is in order has to do with the various ways one can define context (in linguistic, social and cognitive terms). As we saw in connection with the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dicothomy, coherence-based models fail to explain tokens of DMs where a marker signals a two-placed relationship between its host unit and the non-linguistic context:

1.2.1 B. (A arrives with a bag full of groceries) *So*, you've spent all your money

There is no reason to suppose that this way of using DMs is any different in principle from instances where markers establish connections between linguistic segments. It follows, therefore, that coherence is not a property of texts, but of "mental representations constructed on the basis of text, context, and inferences from both" (Blakemore 1987: 106), and as such is a by-product of communicators' efforts to achieve optimal relevance.

There is, however, a third argument against the establishment of rigid taxonomies that becomes immediately apparent if one takes a diachronic perspective to DMs. On the basis of research in the field of grammaticalization theory, I am going to argue in Chapter Two that DMs have undergone or are in the process of undergoing *pragmaticalization*, whereby their *functional spectrum* increases, they frequently undergo *semantic bleaching* as well as changes in their *scope*. Such a process of pragmaticalization draws on a syntactically diverse set of linguistic items (conjunctions, routines, prepositional phrases, etc.), the only common denominator of which is the fact that they are used *metacommunicatively*. In light

[30] cf. e.g. Hansen 1998a.

of all this, it is highly unlikely that such a heterogenous group of items whose individual members represent different stages of pragmaticalization can be modelled in the form of taxonomies that impose rigid boundaries on their respective subcategories. Consequently, in Chapter Two, I am also going to argue that a more fruitful approach to DMs as a category is presented along the lines of Lakoff (1987) and Pelyvás (1995), who view linguistic categories as *graded* and *fuzzy* around the edges, and represent individual members in network models.

1.2.2 Minimalist vs. maximalist approaches

1.2.2.1 Minimalism vs. maximalism and the multifunctionality of DMs

As we saw in the previous section, the multifunctionality of DMs presents insurmountable difficulties for researchers intent on setting up taxonomies. Another theoretical challenge posed by the linguistic items under scrutiny is how to account for the relationship between their various uses. Currently, three different approaches to variable meaning / function can be found in the literature: the homonymy, or *maximalist*, approach; the monosemy, or *minimalist*, approach; and, finally, the *polysemy* approach. The choice between these approaches is, naturally, not specific to research on (mostly) non-truthconditional items such as DMs, but is a problem widely acknowledged in the literature on lexical semantics (cf. Lyons 1977, Cruse 2000: 109, 114). In the case of DMs, however, the issue is even more poignant, since their dependence on context (cf. section 2.2.2) makes it even more difficult to identify a set of meanings/functions of a given item and possible interrelations between them.

The traditional[31] way of dealing with the multifunctionality of discourse particles is homonymy. Proponents of this approach attribute meaning variations to the semantics of the individual item, thus specifying a large number of senses (encoded directly in the lexicon), corresponding to the different contexts in which individual DMs occur. Such an approach is mostly referred to as 'meaning maximalism' or the 'maximalist approach'[32]. Meaning maximalism is thus essentially of a radically semantic nature.

At the other extreme, a strict minimalist will attempt to isolate a single ‘core’ meaning, usually of a highly abstract and schematic nature, from which all uses of a given item can be derived. Any observable variations in the meaning and use of a given word or construction will then be attributed to its interaction with the context in which it occurs. Meaning minimalism is, in other words, a radically pragmatic approach, in which the semantics has very little work to do.

However, as Schiffrin observes, both minimalist and maximalist views require not only an analysis of the given DM, but an analysis of its context (1986:47). For the minimalist, context is a source of inferences which interact with the "core" meaning of a DM; while for the maximalist, context provides information which is compatible with the information

[31] and according to Hansen, the simplest (1998:239).
[32] cf. Fischer 2000, 2005, Aijmer 2002 for detailed reviews.

conveyed by a DM, information that is frequently supposed to form part of the DM's meaning.

One of the major disadvantages of a maximalist appoach is that it might entail confusing the meaning of DMs with that of the contexts in which they occur. It might also lead to problems in actual interpretation, as it is unclear how hearers go about deciding which of the competing homonyms should be activated in a given context. It might of course be argued that they do this on the basis of the meaning of the other words occurring in the utterance. However, as pointed out by Moore and Carling (1982: 187), this could result in combinatorial explosion for utterances containing more than one variable unit. In addition, since meaning maximalism is unable to show the relations between 'homonymous' items, it cannot explain the observation (Traugott: 1990) that there are certain general tendencies in lexical change, such as the tendency for items to move from the propositional through the textual, to the expressive level of discourse (cf. chapter two on grammaticalization).

Minimalism, (a perspective adopted by Schiffrin's pioneering book on DMs), is considered to be a more theoretically satisfying approach. Thus, DMs such as *well*, or *you know* might reasonably be described as having a single basic meaning, while being capable of functioning at different levels (planes) of the utterance, the relevant level being determined, in a particular utterance, by the interaction of syntactic, prosodic and contextual factors[33].

A major criticism levelled against the minimalist approach is that insisting on a strictly minimalist description in all cases may, as pointed out by König (1991: 173), result in descriptions that are too abstract and general[34] to be of practical value. Moreover, the minimalist approach is unable to explain the diachronic fact that the meanings of linguistic elements frequently evolve over time; new uses may be added, while certain others may disappear altogether.

Another objection to taking the minimalist stance comes from language acquisition studies: scholars working in the field of child language acquisition have observed that certain uses of variable items are typically acquired before others. As Hansen argues, if the minimalist stance is correct, "there is no good reason why all the potential uses of a given item should not be equally available at all stages of phylo- and ontogenetic development" (1998b:240).

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[33] cf. Schiffrins coherence-based model described in theprevious section.
[34] or "too summary" (Aijmer 2002:20).

There is, however, a third alternative, namely the 'polysemy' approach[35]. Scholars who take this stance assume that DMs do indeed have inherent, context-independent senses which are not merely a matter of pragmatics, but that rather than being homonymous and discrete, they are related in a (usually) non-predictable, but nevertheless motivated way, either in a chain-like fashion through family resemblances, or as extensions from a prototype.

Polysemy thus not only explains the fact that DMs seem to have fuzzy meaning, but also the fact that different senses/functions of a given DM frequently overlap, making it possible for a given DM to simultaneously fulfill a variety of functions.

In the present study, I take a slightly modified version of the polysemy approach. Central to my thesis is Komlósi's (1997) claim that both pragmatic and semantic meaning is background information evoked by linguistic signal, on the one hand, and that there is a gradience of this background information in terms of context-dependence - context-independence, as a result of which meaning is best seen along such *continua* as propositional - non-propositional meaning / inherent - context-dependent meaning / retrieval of mental models - ad-hoc construction process (p69)[36]. Accordingly, I argue that DMs start out by having inherent, context-independent, propositional meaning, which is gradually replaced / enriched by context-dependent, pragmatic, *procedural* meanings. Thus, what scholars working in the field of DM research would call *side-effects* (cf. Kroon 1995) or *secondary functions* (Schiffrin 1987) of DMs, are implicatures arising as a result of interaction between DMs' inherent meaning and the contexts in which they occur. These implicatures can, over time, become part of the given DM's inherent meaning, or, conversely, can replace the inherent meaning altogether. In the former case, the result is frequent ambiguity between DM and non-DM use as in the case of *now* in example 1.2.2.1.1:

1.2.2.1.1 *Now*, I'd like you to talk about your childhood.

In certain syntactic environments[37], however, the DM (non-propositional) use can completely replace an individual linguistic item's inherent meaning, in which case the most salient meaning is *procedural* and *context-dependent*, as a result of which native intuitions

[35] shared by e.g. Hansen 1998a
[36] Komlósi uses these continua to account for the gradience between entailment and implicature. In my view, however, they are equally relevant in accounting for the diachronic process of semantic-pragmatic broadening.
[37] cf. quasi-initiality and syntactic independens in Chapter Two.

can no longer connect a DM's function to the inherent meaning of the corresponding propositional item. This is the case with such semantically opaque markers as *well* and *but*. In Part II, I am going to elaborate on the functions of these two DMs, at this point, let me use the pragmaticalization of *well* as an example for the process whereby procedural meaning takes over inherent, conceptual meaning. At present, native speakers would have a hard time connecting the function of the DM *well* to the meaning of the adverb *well*, so much so that most researchers analysing the DM *well*, come to the conclusion that the "core" function of *well* is that "all is not well" (cf. Schourup 2001). The apparent contradition is resolved if we take a look at the diachronic development of the DM *well*[38], which, was first used similarly to the token agreement "*yes, but...*". Signalling disagreement, contrast, etc., therefore, started out as the implicature of the adverbial *well*, whereas in most present-day dialects of English it has become the "core" function (procedural meaning) of the DM *well*.

In this section I argued that neither radically minimalist nor radically maximalist approaches can capture the meaning and/or communicative content of DMs, while the polysemy approach needs to be reconsidered in light of the diachronic development of DMs and the fact that distinctions between inherent vs. contextual, propositional vs. non-propositional, conceptual vs. procedural, etc. meaning are best viewed as continua, rather than phenomena with clear-cut boundaries. Notice that in this respect I disagree with those relevance-theoretic accounts of DMs (as in e.g. Blakemore 2002), which state that DMs do not constitute a class of linguistic items on grounds that none of the above discussed properties (context-dependence, non-propositional meaning) provide a distinguishing criterion for DM status. In Chapter Two, in fact, I am going to argue that the combination of such properties will provide the basis for modelling the graded category of DMs. In the following section I am going to briefly review an example of a radically semantic model in order to illustrate that DMs resist description in purely conceptual terms.

[38] cf. Bolinger: 1989.

1.2.2.2 Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage approach

> Particles - little words like *well, why* or *even* - are what distinguishes human language from the languages of robots. Well, perhaps not just particles – there are also interjections, swearwords, and a number of other 'irrational' devices, lexical as well as grammatical, which make human speech distinctly human. But there can be no doubt that small words and expressions such as *well, just, also, as well* and *but*, to mention only those used in this paragraph (with *only* and *very* - and *of course* - belonging of course to the same family) pertain to the very essence of human communication (Wierzbicka 1986a: 519).

When considering minimalist vs. maximalist, (radical) semantic and pragmatic approaches to DMs, and other linguistic categories that either overlap with or are included in the functional class of DMs, a brief discussion about Wierzbicka's fruitful contributions to the field is in order.

Wierzbicka's (1986a) approach is best seen as a reaction against the "radical pragmatic" approach to particles (on the overlap between DMs and particles see section 1.1.2.1) on the one hand and in favour of the "paraphrase approach" on the other. Wierzbicka assumes that all words (even such context-dependent lexical items as DMs) have inherent meaning that can be discovered and explicitly stated and it is the semanticist's task to do so. Accordingly, she attempts to describe the meaning of particles within the framework of what she later dubbed Natural Semantic Metalanguage. She provides NSM descriptions and substitutes them for contextualized items to see if they fit the respective linguistic environments.

By assuming the substitutability of particles with such semantic formulae, Wierzbicka captures the fact that particles may contain the sense of a whole sentence about the mental attitude of the speaker, however, she wrongly assumes that such paraphrases will ever be appropriate enough to convey the range of functions DMs usually take.

In her attempt to disprove the thesis that the meaning of particles cannot be stated in discrete terms and to come up with formulae "substitutable for the delinienda", she seeks to develop an empirically falsifiable framework, which, if proven to work, would, indeed be of tremendous help to researchers, and would, in fact, be of immediate use to language learners

trying to capture the complex meaning of such culture-bound phenomena as e.g. the use of the interjection *atúù* in Ewe, a Kwa (Niger-Congo) language of West-Africa[39] in 1.2.2.2.1:

1.2.2.2.1

I know this: you and I are now in the same place

Before this time, you and I were not in the same place

I feel something good because we are now in the same place

I think you feel the same

I think we have not been in the same place for a long time

I want us to put our arms around each other because of this

I think you want us to do the same

We do this [embrace] at the same time as this: [atúù] because we want to show how we feel (Ameka 1992a: 249)

The framework could, in theory, provide a display of components for each DM, which then would allow comparison between DMs that are in complementary distribution or may be considered minimal pairs, thus enabling us to treat semantic and pragmatic features with the same descriptive methods and within the same theoretical framework.

Unfortunately (but not surprisingly), however, since the framework is empirically falsifiable, it has, indeed been tested and has, as a consequence, been falsified. Wharton (2003), for instance, found that the descriptions of individual DMs often do not become clearer by means of decomposition in NSM terms, and cannot be substituted in the majority of contexts. What is more, the failure of the NSM has, in fact, confirmed the view that a great number of DMs do not encode concepts and at least some part of their communicative content is better described in pragmatic-inferential terms.

[39] I leave it to the reader to decide the validity of this claim, Ameka does need to provide further explanation of the formula, however, in empasizing that the use of 'you and I' in several places is meant to capture "the simultaneous performance of the act" (ibid.).

In order to illustrate that a description of a given DM in NSM terms can never properly account for the interactional (intersubjective), sequential and inferential properties of this functional class of linguistic items, consider the explication of *well* in 1.2.2.2.2:

1.2.2.2.2

I don't want more time to pass like this

this is well (more idiomatically: "this is all right" or "this is okay")

something else has to be said (Wierzbicka 1976:360)

While the above formulation of *well* might provide a convenient starting point for the different uses of this item, it is clear that it can not be substituted in all possible contexts *well* occurs in the corpora I will be using in Part II., nor does this explication do justice to the multifarious uses *well* is put to in naturally-occurring discourse, which I will illustrate in section 3.2.

1.2.3 Speaker meaning vs. utterance interpretation - social and cognitive perspectives on the pragmatics of DMs

As we saw in the previous sections, DMs pose theoretical challenges to researchers because of their multifunctionality and the absence of a single distinguishing criterion for DM status. I have also argued that a maximalist i.e. radically semantic approach to their multifunctionality is inappropriate, because most markers resist conceptual and truth-conditional descriptions, as a result, (at least some of) their communicative content is better described in pragmatic terms.

However, asking the question of what exactly those pragmatic terms are, involves opening up yet another can of worms with respect to the controveries in the field of DM research. In this section, therefore, I am going to compare two perspectives on the role DMs play in communication, one that focuses on what DMs do to the force of speakers' utterances and one that emphasizes DMs' role in facilitating processes of pragmatic inference. The two perspectives also correspond to the distinction between social and cognitive approaches to pragmatics, with their respective emphases on *speaker meaning* and *utterance interpretation*.

Although I have adopted a relevance-theoretic perspective in an attempt to resolve a whole range of controversial issues in DM research (DMs' role in creating coherence, the distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning, etc.), it is important to note at this point that while RT is a powerful tool when it comes to accounting for the role DMs play in the recovery of inferences, it is a theory that has been developed from the point of view of the audience of communicative acts, and as such, does not "take into account the complex sociological factors richly studied by sociolinguistics", as Sperber and Wilson readily admit (1995:279). The founding parents of RT also add that the social character and the social context of communication "are, of course, essential to the wider picture" (ibid.).

The purpose of reviewing some of the sociolinguistic, ethnomethodologist and socio-pragmatic perspectives is, therefore, to gain such a "wider picture", in general, and to prepare the ground for the multifarious uses the DMs *well* and *of couse* can be put to, in particular, a task I will undertake in Part II. In the course of mapping individual DMs' functions with regard to *speaker meaning*, I am also going to give a brief overview of some of the most important milestones in sociolinguistic research to illustrate a discernible move away from *static* towards *more* dynamic variables.

1.2.3.1 Sociolinguistic and socio-pragmatic approaches

Many contemporary pragmaticisists[40] observe that studies in the field of pragmatics usually fall into one of two camps - those who equate pragmatics with *speaker meaning* and those who equate it with *utterance interpretation*. The term *speaker meaning* is frequently used by authors who take a social view of the discipline and who focus on the producer of the message. Conversely, *utterance interpretation* is in the forefront of studies that take a broadly cognitive approach and focuse on the receiver of the message.

Proponents of the two camps occasionally engage in bouts of mud-slinging in an attempt to verify the validity of their respective approaches, examplified by Mey's (1993) sarcastic remarks on the basic premises of Relevance Theory and Blakemore's (2002) response to Mey's criticism. One of the cornerstones of RT (which alligns it with generative grammar as well as Chomskyan pragmatics and other modular approaches) is the aim to give sub-personal explanations rather than explanations at a personal level. This means that RT aims at full explicitness "so that the description or mechanisms specified could be employed by a mindless automaton with the same results as in the human case" (Carston 2000:91). Mey argues that a theory which treats utterance interpretation in this way is "disconnected from everyday communication and its problems" (1993:82), and that the mindless automaton is an inappropriate analogy when one is trying to explain what people do when they communicate. People are "social beings" who interact in "pre-existing conditions" (ibid.), whereas mindless automatons are not.

As a reaction to Mey's criticism Blakemore quotes Chomsky, who points out that only a theory at the personal level could explain how people communicate - how they "pronounce words, refer to cats, speak their thoughts, understand what others say"[41]. Blakemore claims that while communicating in a social context, people are enabled by various sub-personal systems, such as grammatical competence, an inferencing system and the visual system, and these subsystems are "more amenable to scientific enquiry than the person-level activity" called communication (ibid.).

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[40] cf. Thomas 1995:2.
[41] Chomsky 1992:213 quoted in Blakemore 2002:6.

Such controversies aside, the two perspectives complement each other nicely, and the fact that they occasionally draw different conclusions with regard to the same set of linguistic phenomena should not be attributed to any deficiency on either side, but rather to a difference in focus. Accordingly, in this section I am going to review the role of DMs from the perspective of speaker meaning, whereas in the following section the focus will be on utterance interpretation and inferential processes.

When DMs are considered from the socio-pragmatic perspective of *speaker meaning* there seem to be two types of functions at issue. Firstly, it is of interest what markers do to the force of speakers' utterances. A common answer is that the use of DMs helps speakers either to soften or strengthen the pragmatic force of their messages. Many of the terms introduced in studies with a primarily socio-pragmatic orientation reflect an emphasis on the softening and strengthening aspects of DMs (e.g. 'downtoners' and 'boosters' by Holmes:1995, 'downgraders' and 'upgraders' by House and Kasper: 1981, 'hedges' and 'emphatics' by Biber and Finegan: 1989 and Nikula: 1992). Secondly, once certain DMs have been labelled as softeners and strengtheners of pragmatic force, the question that inevitably arises is *why* speakers choose to soften and strengthen the force of their messages in the first place. This question leads to the interpersonal functions of DMs, those of *mitigation* and *emphasis*. Broadly speaking, DMs have often been connected with functions such as 'addressee-orientation'[42] or 'affective meaning'[43]. More specifically, they are frequently seen as markers of politeness. Whether politeness has a place in pragmatic or in sociolinguistic theory is yet another controversial issue.

According to Thomas (1995), there is a division of labour between sociolinguists and pragmaticists in that the former look at language use to see how it *reflects* social relations, while the latter look at the way people use language in order to *change* and *negotiate* social relationships (1995: 133). In other words, sociolinguistics in Thomas's view is mainly concerned with the systematic linguistic correlates of relatively *fixed* and *stable* social variables of an individual (such as region of origin, social class, ethnicity, sex, age, etc.), whereas pragmatics is mainly concerned with describing the linguistic correlates of relatively *changeable* and *dynamic* features of that same individual (such as relative status, social role) and the way in which the speaker exploits his/her (socio)linguistic repertoire in order to achieve a particular goal.

[42] Fox Tree and Schrock 2002: 744.
[43] e.g. Holmes 1995: 87.

With respect to DM research there has been an interesting tendency in sociolinguistically-oriented studies to move away from *fixed, static* variables toward *dynamic, changeable* ones parallel to the realization that DMs role in interaction is best seen in terms of the latter. Thus, while DMs at first were primarily associated with the speaker's sex, social status, occupation, etc., contemporary research, although still performed along the lines of variation analysis in the Labovian sense, tends to take more and more contextual factors into consideration. Below I am going to five a brief outline of some of the most important milestones of this tendency.

Sociolinguists[44] usually focus on a subgroup of DMs, which they call hedges (*well, you know, you see, I mean*). Early accounts tended to view such items as markers of *powerless, inferior* speech closely related to the observation that women tended to use them more frequently than men. However, they also noted, that the fact that a certain linguistic item is labelled as inferior or powerless is, of course, not due to inherent, linguistic features of this item but is instead explained by people associating certain linguistic items with certain types of users (see also section 2.2.6 on the *stigmatization* of DMs).

In due course, the myth (and Lakoff's assumption) that women use DMs to a greater extent than men was dissolved: Dubois & Crouch[45] (1975) found that men, in fact, used more of them than women. Holmes came up with similar results in her 1986 study on the use of *you know* by men and women: she found that there was no significant difference in the overall *frequency* of *you know* in the speech of women and men, she did find, however, differences in the overall *distribution* of hedges. Holmes came to the conclusion that men use *you know* more often than women to express uncertainty (1986:12), whereas women tend to use *you know* "to convey their confidence concerning the addressee's relevant background knowledge" (Holmes 1986:13). It is also worth noting that in mixed-sex interactions the men and women in Holmes's research used *you know* about equally often, whereas in same-sex interactions the men used twice as many instances of *you know*.

Ragan (1983) still makes mention of DMs in the context of *inferior speech*: in a discussion of an analysis of participant behavior in job interviews, she points out that "social or role identities shape conversation, they delineate what kind of conversation the speakers are in" (Ragan 1983: 157). She further suggests that there is a kind of

[44] e.g. Lakoff 1973, Holmes 1986 and 1995, etc.
[45] Their study focused on tag-questions, for the inclusion of tag-questions in the category of DMs cf. Andersen (2001).

metacommunicative talk (she calls it "alignment talk") that displays the conversants' social roles: "through use of alignment talk, actors are presumed to reach definitions of their social situation and to manage their roles in that situation" (p158). Ragan identifies various aligning strategies, among them the use of DMs, whose presence or absence helps to shape the "role orientation" within a conversation. According to Ragan's findings, job applicants used *you know* to a greater extent than interviewers to express uncertainty or tentativeness and also to make their statements more emphatic, which led her to the conclusion that *you know* is a feature of powerless speech[46]. Erman, however, criticizes Ragan's findings, which she based on data from a mere twelve job interviews and states that tentativeness is only one of the multifarious uses *you know* can be put to (1987: 29).

Another, methodologically unsatisfactory, but influential research was carried out by Robin Lakoff, who identified DMs such as *you know, you see, sort of, kind of, I guess* as features she associated with women's language.

The major shortcomings of Lakoff's research[47] with a view on DM research were the fact that it was based on intuitions and anecdotal evidence rather than empirical data on the one hand and it disregarded the fact that tokens of DMs such as *you know*, *you see*, etc. can simultaneously serve more than a single function.

Despite such shortcomings, Lakoff's research opened up new vistas in the field of sociolinguistics and gender studies, and, as a consequence, DM research. As a result of Lakoff's research, more and more scholars came to realize that the relation between linguistic form and communicative function is not as straight-forward as was previously believed, and that in addition to gender, a whole range of (static and dynamic) variables need to be considered in order to explain patterns of linguistic usage.

O'Barr & Atkins's 1980 courtroom study, for example, proved that the above listed features of "women's language" correlate with not only the speaker's social status (a stable variable) but the speaker's previous courtroom experience (a step toward a *dynamic* variable), as well. Consider the following data taken from their study:

1.2.3.1.1

Lawyer: What was the nature of your acquaintance with the late Mrs. E.D.?

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[46] 1983:166-67.
[47] Of which there were many, for a full list see http://www.indiana.edu/~lggender/lakoff-women-language.html.

Witness: ***Well***, we were, ***uh***, very close friends. ***Uh***, she was even ***sort of*** like a mother to me.

1.2.3.1.2

Lawyer: And had the heart not been functioning, in other words, had the heart been stopped, there would have been no blood to have come from that region?

Witness: It may leak down depending on the position of the body after death. But the presence of blood in the alveoli indicates that some active respiratory action had to take place.

1.2.3.1.3

Lawyer: And you saw, you observed what?

Witness: ***Well***, after I heard -- I can't ***really***, I can't definitely state whether the brakes or the lights came first, but I rotated my head slightly to the right, and directly behind Mr Z, and I saw reflections of lights, and ***uh***, very, very, very instantaneously after that, I heard a very, very loud explosion -- from my standpoint of view it would have been an implosion because everything was forced outward like this, like a grenade thrown into a room. And, ***uh***, it was, it was terrifically loud.

On the basis of similar examples O'Barr & Atkins argue that the presence and the absence of DMs such as *well, sort of*, etc. correlate with how comfortable the speaker feels in a courtroom setting.

Another offshoot of Robin Lakoff's controversial study, Holmes's 1986 article on *you know* also starts out as a sociolinguistic essay, yet she considers a whole range of dynamic variables such as DMs' role as facilitative tags, *positive / negative politeness strategies*, markers of *affective meaning*, *floor-yielding devices*, markers of *conjoint knowledge*, strengtheners of the speech act, expressing the speaker's certainty/uncertainty concerning the validity of the proposition, etc. etc.

"Functions of *you know* in women's and men's speech" (Holmes 1986) as well as her book entitled *Women, men and politeness* (Holmes 1995) and especially the article she wrote in cooperation with Maria Stubbe (Stubbe and Holmes 1995), show a deep socio-pragmatic

interest in the linguistic items under scrutiny, yet they all appeared in periodicals and book series that are more likely to be read by sociolinguists than by pragmaticists.

The above overview served to illustrate a tendency in socially-oriented DM research to increasingly concentrate on *dynamic, changeable* features of the communicative context, thus there is a gradual move away from purely sociolinguistic to socio-pragmatic issues. As a result, exhaustive inventories of the functions individual DMs can fulfil in social interaction are readily available to the researcher, such lists will be useful in the course of the empirical research I am going to present in Part II. However, as I mentioned at the beginning of the section, researchers who take a socio-pragmatic perspective to the study of DMs usually concentrate on *speaker meaning* and ignore the role DMs play in utterance interpretation and inferencing. The aim of the following section is, therefore, to fill this methodological gap with the help of one of the most influential theories of inferential pragmatics - Relevance Theory.

1.2.3.2 Inferential pragmatics - DMs' role in utterance interpretation

At the other end of the methodological spectrum, Relevance Theory presents itself as a poweful tool in accounting for the role DMs play in pragmatic processing. Seen from the RT perspective, DMs are inferential facilitators that help the hearer interpret the intended message.

In what follows, I am going to give a brief overview of some of basic tenets of RT from the perspective of its contribution to research in the field of DMs. My primary aim is to illustrate that the distinction between *conceptual* and *procedural* meaning captures an important aspect of the category of DMs and, as a result, will be useful in modelling the graded category of this class.

Utterance interpretation from the perspective of RT is grounded in the claim that human cognition is geared towards the maximisation of relevance. For Sperber and Wilson (1986 and 95), relevance is a potential property of inputs to cognitive processes. Any input (linguistic as well as non-linguistic) may deliver a variety of different types of cognitive effect; it may combine inferentially with existing assumptions to yield new conclusions (in RT terms, contextual implications), it may provide evidence that strengthens existing beliefs, or it may contradict and eliminate existing assumptions. Arriving at the effects of a particular input, however, demands processing effort. For Sperber and Wilson, relevance is, in general terms, a trade-off between cognitive effects and processing effort: the greater the cognitive effects achieved by processing the input, the greater the relevance of that input, the greater the processing effort, the lower the relevance of an input. Given this notion of relevance, to claim that human cognition is geared towards maximising relevance (the cognitive principle of relevance) is to claim that we are designed to look for as many cognitive effects as possible for as little processing effort as possible. All communication, and linguistic communication in particular, makes use of this cognitive drive for relevance. With respect to linguistic communication, Sperber and Wilson claim that every utterance raises quite specific expectations of relevance in the audience, that is expectations about the effects it will yield and the mental effort it will cost: as the *communicative principle of relevance* states, "every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance". There are two clauses of *optimal relevance*:

Optimal relevance

An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience iff:

a. It is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort;

b. It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator's abilities and preferences.

That utterances carry this presumption motivates a particular comprehension procedure, which, in successful communication, reduces the number of possible interpretations: it licenses the hearer to consider possible interpretations in order of their accessibility, enabling her[48] to follow a path of least effort, and to stop as soon as she reaches one that satisfies her expectation of relevance.

Sperber and Wilson also assume that there are two kinds of processes involved in utterance interpretation - *decoding* and *inference*, the distinction between decoding messages and making inferences from evidence (provided by, among other things, such decoded messages), in fact, is the basis of Sperber and Wilson's distinction between *semantics* and *pragmatics*. In addition, a distinction is drawn between two types of linguistically encoded (i.e. inherent, semantic) meaning: *conceptual* meaning and *procedural* meaning. DMs are associated with the latter type of meaning, i.e. they encode procedural information, information on how to manipulate, how to "take" a conceptual representation. Procedural information carried by DMs is thus best understood as a way of constraining (I prefer to use the word *guiding*) the inferential phase of communication, hence Blakemore's (1987) definition of DMs as "semantic constraints on relevance".

It is important to point out that while in Sperber and Wilson's original account the *conceptual - procedural* distinction corresponded to the *truth-conditional - non-truth conditional* dichotomy, Blakemore (2002)[49], proved that there are linguistic items that encode conceptual meaning, but cannot be described in truth-conditional terms. Thus, while the sentence adverbial *seriously* in 1.2.3.2.1 encodes *conceptual meaning* (underscored by the fact that it is synonymous with its non-truth functional counterpart in 1.2.3.2.2), it *does not* contribute to the *truth conditions* of the utterance that contains it:

[48] In RT the speaker is usually referred to as 'he', while the hearer as 'she'.
[49] and revised arguments by Sperber and Wilson themselves.

1.2.3.2.1 *Seriously*, you will have to leave.

1.2.3.2.2 He looked at me very *seriously.*

Blakemore introduces a series of tests and criteria for deciding whether or not a DM encodes conceptual or procedural meaning, these include paraphrasability and compositionality i.e. the potential to combine with other conceptual expressions. Thus *however* in 1.2.3.2.3 is clearly procedural, since it cannot combine with *totally*, whereas *frankly* in 1.2.3.2.4 is conceptual, because it can combine with other lexical items to produce semantically complex expressions:

1.2.3.2.3 Tom likes Italian food. (*Totally) *however*, Anna prefers French cuisine.
1.2.3.2.4 (Speaking quite) *frankly*, I don't think you're right.

Since linguistic items traditionally labelled as DMs (frankly, in other words, however, but, and, well, etc.) display a remarkable heterogeneity with respect to truth-conditionality and procedural meaning[50], Blakemore concludes that there is no class of linguistic phenomena that can be called DMs. However, as I am going to illustrate in the following chapter, if one considers DMs from a diachronic perspective, the fact that the functional class of DMs displays such heterogeneity is not remarkable, at all. Moreover, it might not be accidental, that there are several DMs (*frankly*, *in contrast*, etc.) that can be described in conceptual but not in truth functional terms, at the same time, no DM exists that encodes procedural meaning but retains its propositional potential. Based on the finding that grammaticalization is *unidirectional* (cf. e.g. Traugott 1995), I hypothesise that the following cline might be operational with regard to the pragmaticalization of DMs:

propositional - conceptual < non-propositional - conceptual < non-propositional - procedural

The above hypothesis, naturally, needs to be substantiated by diachronic evidence.

So far I have made frequent reference to the findings of grammaticalization on the same page with Relevance Theory, which would probably startle most theoreticians working in either (but not both) disciplines. In the following chapter, I am going to discuss the

[50] For a detailed overview cf. Blakemore 2002: Chapters Two and Four.

contribution of grammaticalization theory to DM research, and will also briefly mention the possibility of combining the two approaches.

1.3 Conclusions

In this chapter I gave an overview of the definitions and terminology relevant to delimiting the functional class of DMs and highlighted some of my arguments against rigid taxonomies and the conceptual - definitional distinction between pragmatic markers and discourse markers mentioned in the title of the dissertation. Advocating a relevance-theoretic approach, I claimed that DMs, being context-dependent by nature, focus on various elements of the communicators' *mutual cognitive environment,* as well as highlight the speaker's *abilities and preferences* that might influence inferential processes on the part of the hearers.

I also pinpointed some of the theoretical challanges the multifunctionality of individual DMs pose, and claimed that neither a radically pragmatic not a radically pragmatic approach can fully account for the elusiveness of DMs, and that one needs to take the *diachronic development* of individual items into consideration. As regards the pragmatic aspects of DMs' multifunctionality, I claimed that what is needed is a pragmatic approach that accounts for DMs' *role in interaction* as well as *pragmatic inferencing*. After reviewing some of the sociolinguistic, socio-pragmatic and ethnomethodological accounts of DMs' role in interaction, I outlined the basic tenets of one of the most important theories of inferential pragmatics, Relevance Theory. I emphasized the fact that while I adopt an RT perspective with respect to the *procedural meaning* of DMs, I do not agree with Blakemore's (2002) claim, that DMs do not form a class, since they are heterogenous with respect to truth-functionality as well as in terms of the type of meaning (conceptual vs. procedural) they encode. Instead, I claimed members of the functional class of DMs display such properties depending on whether or not they have reached an advanced stage of grammaticalization, and, as a result, individual DMs also display those properties to *varying degrees*.

In the following chapter I am going to further substantiate my claims by using the framework of *grammaticalization theory* as well as *cognitive semantics* in an attempt to explain the heterogeneity of the class of DMs.

Chapter Two - Pragmaticalization and the graded category of DMs

2.0 Preliminaries

As we saw in the previous chapter, attempts to set up taxonomies with regard to the functions and distribution of individual DMs have been extremely unfruitful. DMs, partly due to their multifunctionality, partly to their semantic-pragmatic heterogeneity appear to be extremely elusive and resistant of categorization as well as subcategorization. In this chapter, however, I am going to propose an alternative approach to the functional category of DMs. Based on the findings of grammaticalization theory, I am going to argue that DMs constitute a radial category, some members of which appear to be closer to the *core*, while others are less prototypical examples.

In the first section of this chapter, I am going to review the basic tenets of grammaticalization theory with a view on DM research, as well as present the most important assumptions underlying the hypothesis that DMs constitute a radial category.

In the second section I am going to identify and discuss the criteria for DM status that are going to hold members within the radial category. Some of the criteria (optionality, weak clause association, quasi-initiality) are primarily formal-syntactic, others (non-propositionality, procedural meaning, multifunctionality) are semantic-pragmatic, still others (frequency, orality, stigmatization) are stylistic in nature. Naturally, when using them as criteria that hold members within the category of DMs, they have to be appropriately weighted according to the importance they bear on determining membership. Since DMs constitute a *functional* class on the one hand, and weak clause association, quasi-intitality, etc. are viewed as *side-effects*, rather than *central mechanisms* of grammaticalization - pragmaticalization, on the other, semantic-functional criteria will be considered weightier than formal and stylistic ones.

In the third section I am going to propose a model similar to that put forward by Pelyvás (1995), who argues that the category of English auxiliaries, which appears to be a similarly heterogenous category in terms of its formal-functional properties, is also better conceptualized in terms of prototypes and fuzzy boundaries. I am going to analyse some of the linguistic items whose status as DMs has generated a great deal of controversy in the literature (*frankly, in other words, you know,* etc.), and place them in a hypothetical network

model. I am also going to argue that the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dichotomy needs to be reconsidered in light of the fact that DMs constitute a radial category, since signalling sequentiality / two-place relationships is only one of the relevant features on the basis of which individual DMs can be considered as prototypical or peripheral members, respectively.

My approach naturally brings up a whole range of theoretical issues, since the combination of relevance-theoretic and cognitive semantic premises with those put forward in grammaticalization theory might appear to be a mixture of modular and holistic cognitive approaches on the one hand, and cognitive and social ones on the other. Both issues are, naturally, beyond the scope of the present study. As regards the latter, however, I would like to note that there is a number of scholars[51] who do not altogether think that RT is incompatible with grammaticalization theory. After all, economy and expressivity take a central role in grammaticalization theory as driving forces of diachronic processes, and they readily correspond to the trade-off between processing effort and contextual effects as described in Relevance Theory. As regards mixing holistic and modular cognitive approaches, I have to admit that relevance-theoreticians' view that the semantics - pragmatics dichotomy can be described in terms of two different types of cognitive processes (cf. previous section), is, indeed incompatible with holistic approaches to cognitive linguistics. Recently, Panther and Thornburg[52] have argued that pragmatic inferencing, the recovery of both explicatures and implicatures can, in fact, be described in terms of *metonymy as a cognitive process*, a process that cuts across the *semantics - pragmatics* dichotomy. However, since the concept of *procedural meaning* is a semantic notion even in Relevance-Theoretic terms, I do not, at present, feel qualms about including it in a Lakoff-style cognitive model.

[51] cf. Andersen (2001).
[52] Panther and Thornburg (2003).

2.1 DMs from a diachronic perspective

The process whereby grammatical, lexical and phrasal items the functional category of DMs draws on lose their original, *propositional* meaning and take up *textual, interpersonal*, etc. functions has been alternately associated with *grammaticalization* and *pragmaticalization*. Sometimes the two terms are used interchangeably with relation to DMs (e.g. in Busquets, Koike and Vann:2001). A number of scholars e.g. Erman and Kotsinas (1993) and Aijmer (1997) are convinced that DMs undergo a process of pragmaticalization, while others, including Traugott (1995), feel strongly about the need to describe the process in terms of grammaticalization.

Grammaticalization is defined as a process whereby lexical items take on certain grammatical functions in certain linguistic environments or an already grammatical item takes over new or additional grammatical functions (cf. e.g. Lehmann: 1995, Hopper and Traugott:1994). In contrast, the pragmaticalization of DMs is defined as follows:

> DMs evolve out of processes of "pragmaticalization". At the beginning of such a process, we find lexical items (nouns, adjectives, adverbs and verbal syntagms) with propositional meanings which are used in a metacommunicative way. Through processes of habitualization and automatization, metacommunicative use creates a variant of the original item. At the end of the pragmaticalization process we find specialised DMs whose main function is interactional (Frank-Job:2005).

Traugott (1995) criticizes the use of the term pragmaticalization by Erman and Kotsinas (1993) and Aijmer (1994) to explain the discourse functions of *y'know* and *I think*, respectively, arguing that, for example, *I think* is no more pragmaticalized than tense and aspect or, vice versa, just as grammaticalized as tense and aspect:

> In the linguistic literature, tense, aspect and mood are often treated as syntactic or semantic categories, and may not appear to be as obviously pragmatic as discourse particles, but they have pragmatic functions in most, may be all, languages. We need only think of the English pragmatic use of past for politeness as in <u>What was your</u>

> name?, the well-known backgrounding and foregrounding functions of aspect [and] uses of the narrative present (1995:5)

Pusch, however, observes that approaches in the tradition of Lehmann (1995), which focus on *grammaticalization* as the process by which lexical units develop into grammatical units or grammatical units into 'more grammatical' units, experience difficulties in accounting for the semantic - pragmatic changes DM go through, as DM violate too many parameters such as paradigmaticization, obligatorification or decrease of structural scope (2005:1).

Traugott and König also admit that the semantics-pragmatics of grammaticalization is fraught with difficulties because of the fact that grammaticalization involves semantic weakening, also known as bleaching (1991:190). They claim that grammaticalization is traditionally defined as an evolution whereby linguistic units lose in semantic complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, and phonetic substance, as a result grammaticalization is often viewed as a kind of impoverishment, or deficit; a process whereby signs lose their integrity (ibid.).

In the present paper the following assumptions will be made with regard to the grammaticalization-pragmaticalization DMs go through:

- it will be assumed that DMs have undergone or are in the process of undergoing *pragmaticalization*,
- core members of the *fuzzy category* of DMs are in a more advanced stage of pragmaticalization than peripheral ones,
- *pragmaticalization* can be viewed as an early stage, or sub-process of *grammaticalization* (cf. Traugott 1995),
- the motivation behind the pragmaticalization of DMs is the fact that interactants (*frequently*) use them for *metacommunicative* purposes.

Some of the advantages of these assumptions include the following:

(1) formal and functional features that DMs are traditionally associated with (desribed in the following section) can be accounted for as results of or as triggers to their pragmaticalization, as is clear from:

(a) the clines that have been suggested in grammaticalization research:

content level > epistemic level > illocutionary level > textual level (Crevels 2000:320)

propositional > textual > expressive (Traugott 1995)

(b) the concomitants of grammaticalization and pragmaticalization which include *decategorialization*, *scope changes*, *phonological reduction*, *subjectification*, *syntactic disjunction*, *semantic bleaching* and parallel *pragmatic strengthening*.

(2) when viewed within the framework of grammaticalization/pragmaticalization, DMs are related to other aspects of the lexicon and the grammar of a given language and are described with reference to general linguistic tendencies rather than in terms of their idiosyncratic behaviour.

(3) if we presume that DMs develop from propositional expressions via a *unidirectional* process of semantic change involving greater subjectification, increased discourse function and increased scope (e.g. Brinton 1996, Traugott 1999), minimalist/maximalist and semantic/pragmatic (cf. section 1.2.2) approaches to DMs can be consolidated by positing that in the case of certain markers such changes take place by metaphorical extension of meaning (Willett 1988, Sweetser 1988, 1990), whereas in the case of others they are the result of gradual conventionalization of implicatures (Traugott and König 1991).

In the following section, therefore, while giving an overview of the various properties of DMs that can be identified as criteria that hold individual members within the graded category of DMs, I am also going to relate those criteria to the above assumptions about the process of pragmaticalization.

2.2 Characteristics of DMs, criteria for DM status

2.2.1 Non-propositionality and optionality

As we saw earlier (cf. section 1.1.1), many scholars consider non-propositionality, (non-truth-conditionality) as a sine qua non for DM status, yet, others include propositional items such as *then* and *after that*. While it is generally agreed that certain DMs (e.g. *well*, *however*, *etc.*) contribute nothing to the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed by an utterance, the non-truth conditionality of others (*frankly*, *I think*) have generated a great deal of controversy[53].

As I mentioned in section 1.2.3.2, Blakemore argues that a distinction has to be made between *truth-conditional* and *non-truth conditional* meaning on the one hand, and *conceptual* vs. *procedural* meaning, on the other. Thus, many of the above mentioned controversies stem from the fact that certain scholars confuse the two distinctions and use them interchangeably. Schourup (1999), for example, uses the *compositionality* test to argue in favour of the *truth-conditionality* of *in addition*:

2.2.1.1 Owens is a respected drama critic. I tell you *in addition* that she has written . . .

2.2.1.2 Owens is a respected drama critic. *In addition*, she has written . . .

While *in addition* is indeed truth-conditional, the above test would predict that *frankly* is also truth-conditional, while, as we saw in section 1.2.3.2, DM uses of *frankly* are non-truth conditional, but *conceptual*. It is, therefore, important to point out that the compositionality test will be a useful tool in deciding whether individual DMs have *conceptual* or *procedural* meaning, the *truth-functionality* of DMs is tested more efficiently in terms of whether they retain their original meaning when embedded in *if-clauses* or under the scope of factive connectives such as *because*:

2.2.1.3 *Allegedly / Obviously / Frankly,* the cook has poisoned the soup.

[53] see Infantidou-Trouki: 1992.

2.2.1.4 If the cook has *allegedly / ?obviously / *frankly* poisoned the soup, we can eat the meal without worrying.

2.2.1.5 We shouldn't eat the soup, because the cook has *allegedly/?obviously/*frankly* poisoned it.

The uncertainty with regard to whether or not *obviously* retains its original meaning in 2.2.1.3[54] once again suggest that the truth-functionality - non-truth functionality distinction should be viewed as a *continuum*, rather than a dichotomy, which is consistent with the finding in grammaticalization theory that due to the diachronic grammaticalisation processes that are synchronically manifested in the use of pragmatic markers, there is sometimes a *gradation* between uses that are non-truth conditional and (omissible) and those that are not[55].

Optionality as a distinguishing feature is in many respects derivative of the previously discussed criterion of non-propositionality, DMs are considered optional from the perspective of sentence meaning because their absence does not change the conditions under which the sentence is true.

There are, however, two further senses in which DMs are claimed to be optional. Firstly, they may be seen as *syntactically optional* in the sense that removal of a DM does not alter the grammaticality of its host sentence. Secondly, they are optional in the sense that if a DM is omitted, the relationship it signals is still available to the hearer, though no longer explicitly cued[56].

The above statement does not entail that DMs are useless, rather, it reflects the view according to which DMs guide the hearer toward a particular interpretation of the connection between a sequence of utterances and at the same time rule out unintended interpretations. Consider the following:

2.2.1.6 The others are going to Stoke. *However*, I am going to Paris.

2.2.1.7 The others are going to Stoke. I am going to Paris.

[54] for a detailed discussion, cf. Blakemore (2002).
[55] cf. Andersen 2001:41–42.
[56] cf. Schourup 1999: 231.

It is clear that he above pair of utterances could lead the hearer to draw the same inferences, the second, however, makes it easier for the hearer to arrive at the interpretation the speaker intended.

It is important to note that the above considerations concerning the optionality of DMs reflect attempts to establish criteria for DM status; the term "optional" is purely a formal characteristic of the class of linguistic items and has no implications of redundancy, whatsoever. If one goes beyond the treatment of DMs as "social noises", "idiosyncratic uses of language" and "verbal fillers"[57], it becomes clear that the inferential, expressive, phatic, attitudinal, etc. content of the utterance would naturally suffer a great deal without the use of the DM, even in the case of markers such as *you know* or *I mean*.

2.2.2 Context-dependence

As a briefly mentioned in the introduction, the study of DMs brings up fundamental questions about the semantics/pragmatics interface (or boundary as the case might be), since, on the one hand, DMs usually have context-dependent meaning, on the other hand, they are frequently mentioned as linguistic units that are inherently indexical. In fact Aijmer considers indexicality as the most important property of DMs, a property whereby DMs are linked to attitudes, evaluation, types of speakers and other features of the communicative situation[58]. In this respect DMs can be compared to deictics. Incidentally, definitions of deictic expressions overlap to a great extent with those of DMs. Both categories are usually defined in terms of context-dependence i.e. in terms of having meaning only by virtue of an indexical connection to some aspect of the speech event[59].

Taking the above into consideration, one could argue that DMs are indeed a subgroup of indexicals; in a comprehensive article on deixis, Levinson, in fact, calls DMs discourse deictics, other subgroups including spatial, temporal and social deictics[60]. Parallels drawn between the two types of linguistic phenomena are also relevant from the perspective of a general theory of language as well, since the description Levinson provides

[57] see section 2.10 on the stigmatization of DMs.
[58] cf. Aijmer 2002:5.
[59] cf. e.g. Sidnell (1998).
[60] cf. Levinson (2004).

of some of the problems surrounding deixis could easily characterise the status DMs fill in linguistic research:

> For those who want to treat language as a generative system for objectively describing the world, deixis is one hell of a big black fly in the ointment. Deixis introduces subjective, attentional, intentional and of course context-dependent properties into natural languages. (Levinson 2004: 97).

Similarities between indexicals and DMs are also recognized by proponents of Relevance Theory. Carston, for example, notes that the two seemingly disparate phenomena are brought together by the fact that both encode a *procedure* rather than a *concept*, and both play a role in guiding the hearer in the pragmatic inferential phase of understanding an utterance[61]. The difference between the two sets of phenomena, according to Carston, is that indexicals constrain the inferential construction of *explicatures* and DMs (discourse connectives in RT terms) constrain the derivation of *implicatures* (in other words, intended contextual assumptions and contextual effects). For a detailed discussion of procedural meaning and the treatment of DMs in Relevance Theory see section 1.2.3.2.

It is important to point out that, from the perspective of grammaticalization theory, the criterion of *context-dependence* is an important by-product of the process whereby DMs lose their *inherent, context-independent* meaning and take up more *subjective, textual* and *interpersonal* functions.

2.2.3 Multifunctionality

As we saw earlier, in addition to playing a role in pragmatic inferencing, individual DMs are also associated with a plethora of functions including hedging and politeness functions. What is more, they can also be salient in conversational exchanges as openers, turn-taking devices, hesitational devices, backchannels, markers of topic shift and of receipt of information, and so on[62].

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[61] Carston 1998:24.
[62] cf. e.g. Brinton 1996:370.

Eduard H. Hovy, a scholar advocating Rhetorical Structure Theory as a model of discourse and as an approach to DMs, makes an interesting observation about why DMs are multifunctional by necessity. His argument runs as follows: in natural languages, discourse structure is only signalled by three mechanisms; stress, word order and DMs, therefore, in his view, it is a strange fact of English (and several other languages) that the number of discourse relation words/phrases is a lot smaller than the number of verbs or nouns.

> One might expect that, given 50.000 verbs (i.e., distinguishably different processes or actions), the number of semantically plausible interconnections among them is on the order of at least half of the total number of possible interconnections, thus half of $25x10^8$, a large number. But the number of semantic cue words [DMs] appears to be fewer than 1.000 (Hovy 1995: 9).

According to Hovy, because of the above, DMs are multifunctional and ambiguous by design, since there is a lot of *interpersonal* and *discourse* burden on their signalling capacity. Since DMs signal interpersonal and discourse functions simultaneously, it is no wonder that they are ambiguous between the three different interpretations on the one hand, on the other hand they are vague with regard to signalling particular relations on a given level as well.

The deficiencies in Hovy's framework and the moot points in his argument[63] illustrate the hazards of taking a purely theory-driven, top-down approach to DMs on the one hand, on the other, of disregarding the role of inferencing in the recovery of connections between (mental representations) of discourse segments.

The multifunctionality of DMs also brings up the question of whether different uses of a given marker are to be considered incidental and unrelated (maximalist approach) or motivated and related (minimalist approach) and whether there is an invariant "core meaning" of DMs that is context-independent and preserves some component of the lexeme's original semantic meaning (for a full review see section 1.2.2).

Viewed from a diachronic perspective, different uses of individual markers may also be the result of change in progress (in the case of markers with ideational as well as

[63] e.g. the assumption that the above mechanisms are the only ones that signal coherence completely ignores the role of inferences and other pragmatic processes.

interpersonal and textual properties) or the end-point of grammaticalisation, respectively. Romaine and Lange observe that there may be a greater propensity for grammaticalization in languages like English due to the multifunctionality of many items in its lexicon. By way of illustration, they quote Bauer (1983: 226), who notes that conversion (also viewed as a process of grammaticalization) has almost no limitations in English since all syntactic classes seem to be eligible and are able to produce words of almost any other syntactic class[64]. While one has to admit that English has a propensity for conversion, I have doubts about the priviliged status of English with regard to the grammaticalization - pragmaticalization of DMs. Cross-linguistic research has proven that there is a wide array of such item in a variety of languages ranging from Catalan to classical Latin (or consider the Hungarian *hát, tudnillik, aszongya*, *tulajdonképpen*, etc.).

Before I turn to other characteristics of DMs, an empirical note is in order in connection with multifunctionality. As was mentioned before, DMs can be ambiguous on several different levels[65], as well as on a particular level, which brings up the question of *intentionality* on the part of the hearer and interpretation on the part of the listener. This point is especially relevant with regard to *affective* meaning, since, as Ochs and Schieffelin (1979) point out linguistic items usually convey a *range* of affective meanings, rather than pinpoint a *precise* affective meaning. In other words, a DM such as *well* or *you know*, when considered in natural context, may simultaneously reflect *face management*, *lack of social distance*, *attitudes* to the propositional content of the utterance, etc. Many researchers (see section 1.2.1) prefer to assigne indidual occurrences of DMs into neat functional categories (which is often reflected in their empirical findings) without considering the possibility of *intentional* or *incidental ambiguity*.

2.2.4 Weak clause association, phonological reduction, variable scope

It is frequently observed in the literature that DMs usually occur either outside the syntactic structure or loosely attached to it[66]. Quirk et al. classify many linguistic items that are elsewhere included among DMs as *conjuncts* (e.g. *nonetheless*) which are considered to

[64] Romain and Lange 1998: 268.
[65] whether one uses Haliday and Hasan's simplified model of ideational, interpersonal and textual functions of language or Schiffrin's five domains of discourse.
[66] cf. e.g. Brinton, 1996: 34 and Hansen, 1997: 156.

be clause elements but to have a detached role relative to other, more closely interrelated clause elements such as subject, complement, and object:

> Conjuncts are more like disjuncts than adjuncts in having a relatively detached and 'superordinate' role as compared with other clause elements (1985: 631).

In addition, some of the items that Quirk et al. refer to as "disjuncts" (e.g. *obviously*, sentence initial *surprisingly* and *frankly*) also display a whole range of properties associated with the functional class of DMs, as will be illustrated in the network model I am going to present in section 2.3.

It is important to note that the property of weak clause association is relative to elements *external* to the DMs form, since a whole range of DMs clearly have their own internal syntactic structure (e.g. *on the other hand*) and certain other DMs (e.g. *y'know, I mean*) are clearly clausal despite the fact that the latter are considered to be non-compositional (procedural) and non-truth-conditional.

Weak clause association is frequently discussed in relation to phonological independence: DMs often constitute independent tone units, or are set off from the main clause by 'comma intonation'[67].

Adding *weak clause association* and a corresponding *lack of intonational integration* to our list of criteria is also justified from the perpective of grammaticalization theory. An important clause of the definition of grammaticalisation (cf. 2.1) states that it takes place in special *morpho-syntactic environments*. In the case of DMs, this environment can be associated with sentence-initial position, hence many scholars regard quasi-initiality as a distinguishing feature of DMs[68]. However, once DMs enter an advanced stage of grammaticalization, they become syntactically independent, and can appear at various parts of the sentence, with an accompanying 'comma intonation'. Their position in an utterance also influences their *scope*, a characteristic also identified in grammaticalization research. Compare 2.1.4.1 and 2.1.4.2:

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[67] cf. Hansen, 1997: 156.
[68] cf. e.g. Schourup (1999).

2.2.4.1 KING: I know how close you are to your mom. How old is she?

MAHER: *Well*, she probably doesn't want me to say...

2.2.4.2 You're not going to have quality if you can't sleep and you itch and you bitch and you weep and you cry and you bloat and you can't remember anything and you don't have a, *well*, sex drive.

As the examples above show, the size of the linguistic unit *well* can take in its scope ranges from a whole sentence through clausal elements to single words. Waltereit (2005) observes that this variability is a remarkable property, but it is not an exclusive feature of DMs, since conjunctions as a word-class (and even some individual conjunctions as a lexical item) can also have variable scope, giving the following sentences as examples:

2.2.4.3 Ed and Doris loved each other.

2.2.4.4 Ed worked at the barber's, and Doris worked in a department store.

In 2.2.4.3 *and* has scope over two NPs, in 2.2.4.4 it has scope over two clauses. The difference between *and* used as a conjunction and its DM use, however, lies in the fact that the scope of the conjunction *and* can always be determined in *grammatical terms*. It could be defined as ranging over two constituents of the same type adjacent to *and* , which, in turn, make up a constituent of again the same type. The scope of DMs, in contrast, cannot be determined in grammatical terms, as is clear from the examples taken from Schiffrin 1987:

2.2.4.5 My husband got a notice t'go into the service

and we moved it up.

And my father died the week ... after we got married.

And I just felt, that move was meant to be[69].

[69] Schiffrin 1987: 53, author's original emphasis.

On the basis of the above examples, Schiffrin concludes that *and* has "freedom of scope", rather than "variable scope", since "we can no more use *and* to identify the interactional unit that is being continued than we can use *and* to identify the idea that is being coordinated"[70].

Traugott (1995) relates the feature of variable scope[71] to grammaticalization and argues that in addition to Nominal clines (nominal adposition > case) and verbal clines (main verb > tense, aspect, mood marker), which are "staples of grammaticalization theory", a further cline: Clause internal Adverbial > Sentence Adverbial > Discourse Particle should be added to the inventory[72]. According to Traugott, this cline involves increased *syntactic freedom* and *scope*.

2.2.5 Procedural meaning / non-compositionality

Although most scholars[73] treat non-compositionality as a property of DMs *per se,* we saw earlier that Blakemore (2002) associates DMs with procedural meaning and uses non-compositionality as a *test* to decide whether individual items are conceptual or procedural.

Blakemore also claims that if DMs are synonymous with their non-DM counterparts, they encode conceptual meaning. Thus *seriously* and *in other* words in 2.2.5.1 and 2.2.5.3 encode a concept parallel to 2.2.5.2 and 2.2.5.4, respectively, *well* (as in 2.2.5.5), however, encodes a procedure, since it is not synonymous with *well* in 2.2.5.6:

2.2.5.1 *Seriously*, you will have to leave.

2.2.5.2 He looked at me very *seriously*.

2.2.5.3 *In other words*, you're banned.

2.2.5.4 She asked me to try and put it *in other words*.

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[70] Schiffrin 1987:150.
[71] In the above cited paper Traugott deals with a subgroup of DMs, whose original function is that of sentence adverbials.
[72] Traugott 1995:1.
[73] cf. Schourup:1999.

2.2.5.5 A: What time should we leave?

B: *Well*, the train leaves at 11.23.

2.2.5.6 You haven't ironed this very *well*.

A second test Blakemore uses is to see if a given item can combine with linguistic items encoding conceptual meaning to produce complex expressions. Thus, *in confidence* and *frankly* do not encode procedural meaning, as is illustrated by 2.2.5.7 and 2.2.5.8, respectively:

2.2.5.7 In total, absolute confidence, she has been promoted.

2.2.5.8 Speaking quite frankly, I don't think people ever ask themselves those kind of questions.

Since the functional class of DMs behaves rather heterogenously in terms of having procedural meaning, Blakemore concludes that DMs do not form a homogenous class and, therefore, should not be the object of inquiry[74]. With regard to the second test, I argued in section 1.2.3.2 that the criterion of non-compositionality / procedural meaning is yet another characteristic of the functional class of DMs that, in combination with other (formal and functional) features, helps us identify core and peripheral members of a fuzzy category.

As far as the question of synonymity is concerned, it is important to note that the fact that, on the basis of native intuitions, no correspondance can be found between the adverbial *well* and its DM counterpart, does not mean that such a relationship is absent[75]. Native intuitions, naturally, disregard diachronic aspects of individual lexical and grammatical items, and it is exactly these aspects that account for the fuzziness of the category of DMs.

There is no telling if, at some point in the future, a synchronically non-compositional i.e. *procedural* DM corresponding to *in other words* will appear or not (perhaps with an

[74] Instead, the focus of interest should be the conceptual meaning-procedural meaning dichotomy.
[75] On the diachronic development of *well* cf. Finell 1989 and section 3.

accompanying phonetic reduction e.g. *thererds or *therds). In addition, there are no empirical reasons to exclude the emergent (or peripheral) DM *in other words* from the functional category of DMs as my network model in section 2.3 will illustrate.

2.2.6 High frequency, orality, stigmatization

In this section I am going to consider some of the stylistic features core members of the functional class of DMs display. As I argued in section 2.0, semantic-functional properties are more important in determining class membership than formal and stylistic ones. The reason this section is somewhat lengthier than previous ones, therefore, does not have to do with the importance of stylistic features in deciding class membership, but with several important theoretical points I want to make in terms of the frequency, orality, stigmatization, etc. of DMs.

Firstly, in this section I intend to dissolve the myth (shared by laypeople at large and various camps of linguists, as well) that DMs are *meaningless social noises*. It is usually the very stylistic features that I am going to discuss in this section that usually lead to such erroneous views. Accordingly, I am going to refute the "random sprinkling hypothesis" on the one hand, and discuss some of the reasons DM research was a neglected field of inquiry in the past.

Secondly, this section is also important from the perspective of the emperical research I am going to present in Part II. Towards the end of the section I am going to argue that written vs. oral discourse should not be viewed as a dichotomy, but rather as a *continuum* and that particular manifestations of discourse can be placed on the spoken / written continuum along dimensions such as closeness / distance, degree of dialogicity, spontaneity, etc. Since the corpus I have compiled for empirical research is based on *televised interviews*, in Part II, I am going to explain differences between the patterns found in my data and those that were suggested in previous research (mostly based on *surreptitiously recorded casual conversations*) by making reference to the dimensions I am going to describe in this section.

Before I discuss some of the social stigmas and erroneous views stemming from the frequent use of DMs in everyday talk, let me, fist of all, summarize some of the main arguments *against* the belief that DMs display *idiosyncratic behaviour*. Firstly, it is

important to note that high frequency of use is the *backbone* of various processes of grammaticalization as well as pragmaticalization[76]. In other words, the more frequently an item is used, the more likely it is that its formal-functional properties are going to change, and once it has entered the process of grammaticalization, the faster it is going to go through the substages of that process. Secondly, let me briefly address the issue of stigmatization. The high frequency of DMs in the speech of different social and occupational groups e.g. adolescents, surfers, etc. usually triggers negative attitudes. The application of terms such as "overuse" and "idiosyncracy", however, should be avoided at all costs, since such terms suggest that no further analysis is necessary. As Erman points out, speakers are rational and economical and are, consequently, not likely to use any linguistic means without a conscious or subconscious purpose[77].

A number of studies on DMs (comprehensive and case studies alike) observe that DMs occur primarily in speech[78]; in fact, one of the most salient features of oral style is the use of items such as *well, right, ok, you know,* etc. In the course of drawing up a list of contrasting characteristics of spoken and written language, Brown and Yule label *well, erm, I think, you know, if you see what I mean, I mean, of course* "prefabricated fillers"[79].

The use of the word 'fillers' carries some of the bad connotations familiar in the literature (propogated by linguists and non-linguists alike). Kroon, for example, observes that the view that DMs are "meaningless fillers" goes back to ancient times; to Vergil's statements according to which their sole function is to serve as ornaments ("sciendum multas particulas ad *ornatum* pertinere" and "*vacat* enim et *tantum ad ornatum* pertinet")[80].

The reason why non-linguists tend to frown upon the exaggerated use of *you know* and *you see* is quite understandable: it is a well documented fact in the sociolinguistic literature that laypeople (native and non-native speakers alike) do not have very good intuitions about their own language use, what is more, they frequently get annoyed when confronted with their own speech output in the form of the recordings or transcripts of sociolinguistic interviews[81].

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[76] cf. e.g. Ariel 1998:245.
[77] Erman 1987: 33.
[78] e.g. Brinton 1996: 33, Watts 1989: 203.
[79] Brown and Yule 1983: 17.
[80] *Aeneis* by Vigil, 1.331 and 8.84, respectively, quoted in Kroon 1995: 37.
[81] cf. e.g. Romaine and Lange 1998: 261.

There is another important sociolinguistic finding that has to be mentioned in connection with the stigmatization of certain DMs, namely the fact that there is never a language-internal, intrinsic reason for the stigmatization of a given linguistic feature. Just as people's attitudes to a non-standard variety of a given language reflect their attitudes to the speakers of that variety, negative attitudes to DM uses of *like, stuff like that* and *you know* reflect negative attitudes to social groups and social situations such items are (often wrongly) associated with. As far as DMs are concerned the reason we often find individual DMs in the spotlight of critical remarks is on the one hand adults' concern about the language of adolescents[82], on the other hand, such items are considered (again, wrongly) to be features of spoken (unplanned) discourse and informal situations.

The fact that DMs generated no interest in *linguistic circles* until relatively recently[83], on the other hand, has to do with a neglect of linguistic items that do not affect truth conditions, as I mentioned in section 2.2.1. In addition, DMs are often related to the "memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest and errors" which Chomsky assumes are irrelevant for linguistic theory as is apparent from the following quotation:

> Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance (Chomsky 1965: 3).

[82] closely related to the concerns about the corruption and decay of 'our language'; cf. Andersen 1998: 2 and Nádasdy 2003.

[83]The reason particles were largely neglected even before the Chomskyan revolution is succinctly summarized by Locke as early as 1690 (Locke was referring to particles in general, but his statements hold equally true for DMs at large): "This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines: in these and the like there has been great diligence used; and articles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But though prepositions and conjunctions, etc. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct sub-divisions; yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into their own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing" (Locke 1690: Chapter 7).

In this type of theoretical framework many DMs are likely to be considered only pseudo-linguistic devices, possibly "performance errors" that may safely be ignored as essentially random and unpredictable.

Far be it from me to use Chomsky's above statement (one, which I feel has been the single, most frequently used quotation for the purpose of Chomsky-bashing) to criticise the theoretical framework of generative grammar and the Chomskyan paradigm[84]. Let me simply like point out the fact that the distribution of seemingly meaningless expressions such as *like*, *you know* and *you see* (occasionally referred to as "verbal tic"[85]) is, first of all, not random and, secondly, such items are not interchangeable: two arguments in favour of their being part of the linguistic system and as such of their being worthy objects of scientific inquiry. As regards the former argument, it is easy to illustrate the meaningfulness and distinctive (as opposed to random) use of even the two most often stigmatized DMs, *you know* and *I mean*. As examples 2.2.6.1 and 2.2.6.2 illustrate, it matters where *you know* or *I mean* appear in an utterance:

2.2.6.1 Original: me and the Edinburgh girl got together after dinner late in the evening and decided they'd really got us along to make it look right, *you know* they had after all had candidates from other universities.

Alternative: me and the Edinburgh girl got together after dinner *you know* late in the evening and decided they'd really got us along to make it look right, they had after all had candidates from other universities.

2.2.6.2 Original: but I don't think it's feasible . *I mean* I know this is the first time I've done it, and I'm not in a main line paper, but I'm sure it'll take me all my time to do it in three weeks.

---

[84] Wierzbicka, for example makes the following, especially harsh statement about the neglect of particles in connection with generative linguistics: "Another major reason for the neglect of particles in modern linguistics […] lies in the a-semantic and a-pragmatic orientation of much of modern linguistics. This applies, in particular, to such extremely influential schools as American structuralism and Chomskyan linguistics. At the times when (and in places where) grammar was purposefully divorced from meaning, and when 'generative grammar' was purposefully divorced from real-life communication involving fullblooded human beings (rather than automata), in an atmosphere when supreme value was placed on keeping apart 'language structure' and 'language use', particles did not have much chance. Their very existence was an embarrassment, as evidence that language is, after all, SOMEBODY'S language" (Wierzbicka 1986a: 520).

[85] Oreström 1983:33.

Alternative: but I don't think it's feasible . I know *I mean* this is the first time I've done it, and I'm not in a main line paper, but I'm sure it'll take me all my time to do it in three weeks[86].

2.2.6.1 Original, *you know* comments on what is meant by "look right", whereas in 2.2.6.1 Alternative it comments on what "after dinner" means (in other words they differ in what they take within their *scope*, see section 2.2.4). In 2.2.6.2 Original, *I mean* comments on why the speaker says "I don't think it's feasible," without overwriting the statement, but in 2.2.6.2 Alternative, *I mean* comments on "I know", retrospectively treating it as a false start.

As for the second type of argument in favour of the meaningfulness / non-random distribution of DMs (the fact that they are not interchangeable), consider the following:

2.2.6.3 Original: and I was the only person there that was sort of remotely *you know* competent to speak.

Alternative: and I was the only person there that was sort of remotely *I mean* competent to speak.

2.2.6.4 Original: the interview was - it was all right *I mean* I handled it like a competent undergraduate - I didn't handle it like a graduate who knew where she was going cos I didn't.

Alternative: the interview was - it was all right *you know* I handled it like a competent undergraduate - I didn't handle it like a graduate who knew where she was going cos I didn't.

In 2.2.6.3 Original, *you know* comments on what the speaker was remotely able to do, but in 2.2.6.3 Alternative, *I mean* in *you know*'s place suggests a false start / self-correction, for example to achieve the effect of removing "sort of remotely" to yield "and I was the only person there that was competent to speak." In 2.2.6.4 Original, *I mean* marks a consecutive adjustment, suggesting in this case that perhaps "all right" is not an appropriate phrase to

[86] adapted from Fox Tree and Schrock 2002:731, preserving their transcription conventions.

use under the circumstances. In 2.2.6.4 Alternative, however, *you know* in *I mean*'s place foreshadows some sort of elaboration of the initial statement, without any qualification on how "all right" the interview was. Since the two DMs cannot be substituted for one another, it follows, that they have distinct functions and cannot have a random distribution.

In addition to the above line of argument in favour of the meaningfulness of (oral) DMs, one should also take into consideration the fact that there is no principled basis on which one could exclude from the functional class of DMs connectives such as *however, after all, consequently* and a whole range of other items characteristic of written style, some of which (e.g. *besides*, *however*, *moreover*) are in fact included in Brown and Yule's above mentioned list of characteristics of *written* language.

In connection with considerations of the orality of DMs it is important to note that written vs. oral discourse should not be viewed as a dichotomy, but rather as a *continuum*[87]. Particular manifestations of discourse can be placed on the spoken / written continuum on the basis of several criteria along different dimensions. In the second, empirical part of my dissertation I am going to argue that the reason we find differences between the distribution of DMs in spoken corpora such as the London Lund Corpus and the corpus I have put together for purposes of analysis is that my corpus is based on televised interviews, which can be distinguished from everyday conversation on account of an interplay of several of the criteria below[88]:

1) Extent to which the communication is made public. This concerns both the number of intended recipients and the possible presence of an audience. An elaboration of this parameter is found in Goffman 1981 (pp132-133), who distinguishes between ratified and unratified participants, and within these, between addressed and unaddressed recipients on the one hand, and between overhearers and eavesdroppers on the other. Heritage's systematic analysis (perhaps the first of its kind) of news interviews (1985: 112) echoes this parameter by defining news interviews as "functionally specialized forms of social interaction produced for an overhearing audience and restricted by institutionalized conventions"[89].

[87] Hansen 1998a: 91.
[88] adopted from Hansen 1998a: 52.
[89] Heritage 1985: 112.

2) Degree of intimacy between interlocutors. This may be a function of previous interaction, of shared knowledge and experience, of the degree of institutionalization of the interaction at hand, etc.

3) Degree of emotional involvement on the part of the interlocutors. Such involvement may be directed towards other interlocutors, and/or towards the subject-matter of the discourse. Chafe (1982: 46) in his discussion of involvement in speech notes that a speaker may, of course, also be involved with herself.

4) Extent to which the communicative process depends on the situational context.

5) Referential immediacy vs referential distance. In other words, whether or not discourse referents are to be found mainly in the vicinity of the speaker *origo*.

6) Physical closeness vs distance (in both space and time) between interlocutors.

7) Degree of cooperation between interlocutors. This is said to be measurable by the hearer/reader's ability to directly influence the discourse as it is produced.

8) Degree of dialogicity. This concerns primarily the nature of the turn-taking rules which apply, especially whether and to what extent these allow new speakers to regularly and spontaneously take over the floor.

9) Degree of spontaneity.

10) Degree of topic fixation.

2.3 The outline of a network model of the functional class of DMs

In the previous sections I reviewed some of the aspects, triggers and results of the process of pragmaticalization individual members of the functional class of DMs go through. I also identified and discussed at some length the formal-syntactic (optionality, weak clause association, quasi-initiality), semantic-functional (non-propositionality, procedural meaning, multifunctionality, context-dependence, variable scope) as well as stylistic (frequency, orality, stigmatization) properties that, as I argued, can be viewed as the concomitants of the various stages of pragmaticalization. The hypothesis that DMs constitute a radial category is based on the fact that they display the above properties to varying degrees, i.e. they are currently undergoing different stages of pragmaticalization. Accordingly, the properties identified in section 2.2 serve as criteria for membership in the graded category of DMs.

Figure 2.3 provides an outline of a network model of the functional class of DMs, and the place of some of its members relative to each other in terms of core and periphery. The figure is based on Pelyvás's (1995) adaptation of Lakoff's (1987) cognitive model. Pelyvás's study focused on the class of English auxiliaries, a similarly heterogenous category in terms of its formal-functional properties.

The model includes some of the linguistic items whose status as DMs has generated a great deal of controversy in the literature, decisions about whether or not an individual member displays a given property were based on the formal tests described in sections 1.2.3.2 and 2.2.5, on the one hand, and along the lines of previous research referred to in connection with those tests. In the case of *well* and *of course*, I relied on the corpus I compiled for the purposed of empirical research I am going to present in the next chapter and on the result of that research to be discussed later. The numbers in the figure represent the following properties:

1. non-propositionality
2. optionality
3. context-dependence
4. multifunctionality
5. sequentiality
6. weak clause association
7. variable scope
8. procedural meaning - non-compositionality
9. high frequency
10. orality



* absent or not applicable

? this property is displayed to varying degrees

figure 2.3 an outline of a network model of the functional class of DMs

It is important to note that the above figure only offers a snapshot of the pragmaticalization of individual DMs, in reality, the picture is a lot more dynamic. One symptom of this is the fact that we can find question marks with regard to the truth-functionality of a number of items, which underscores the observation that not only do DMs constitute a heterogenous class with respect to the criteria identified as the property of the class, but individual members also display individual properties to *varying degrees*, which is

another sign of change in progress. The question marks, naturally, also add fuel to the heated debates between individual scholars approaching both truth-functionality and the class of DMs from opposing perspectives[90].

2.4 Conclusions

While in chapter one I discussed some of the theoretical challenges DMs pose as a result of their *heterogeneity* and *multifunctionality*, in this chapter, I outlined an alternative approach to accounting for the elusive nature of the linguistic items under scrutiny. I argued that the reason for such heterogeneity is the fact that individual DMs are at different stages in the process of *pragmaticalization*. As a result, individual DMs may not share all the properties that characterize the class as a whole (as well as prototypical members), and even if they do, they might display such properties to *varying degrees*. After identifying the relevant properties, I offered a model of representing DMs as a *graded category*, in which DMs can be placed relative to their closeness to the core or the periphery, respectively.

One general conclusion to this chapter, once again, has to do with the necessity to reconsider the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dichotomy raised in the title of the dissertation. As we saw, DMs are undergoing a process of pragmaticalization whereby they move along the propositional < textual < interpersonal cline, identified by Traugott (1995). This is coupled with the fact that, as a result of this process, they are best conceptualized as a radial category where sequentiality / signalling two-place relationships is only one of the relevant properties on the basis of which individual DMs can be considered as prototypical or peripheral members. Consequently, the distinction between discourse markers and pragmatic markers should be seen as a *continuum*, rather than a dichotomy. In the following two chapters I am going to argue that individual occurrences of DMs simultaneously mark textual and interpersonal relations, thus, there is no *empirical* foundation for a clear-cut distinction between the two functions, either.

[90] on the debate around the truth-functionality of *I think* and *frankly*, *see* Infantidou-Trouki: 1992.

Part II. Case studies

Introduction to Part II.

An important conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the first part of my dissertation is that the elusive nature of DMs with respect to categorization calls for a methodology (or a combination of methodologies) that takes account of their multifunctionality and context-dependence on the one hand, and the heterogeneity of the class of DMs, on the other.

Similarly, when it comes to empirical research, it is important to combine methodologies in a way that best accounts for the data under analysis. Empirical studies of individual DMs usually fall into one of two types, some scholars give a comprehensive account of the multifarious uses of DMs but base their arguments on a small number of examples, while others analyse massive amounts of data but use scripts and algorithms that overlook a whole range of relevant contextual factors as well as grossly simplify the diversity of functions DMs can fulfill. Therefore, in an attempt to account for the functional spectrum of *well* in my corpus, I am going to combine *qualitative* and *quantitative* analysis. While the corpus I have compiled is comparable in size to most corpora that have been used in *quantitative research*, I am going to present the results of a procedure whereby I *manually indexed* all 1839 tokens of *well* in the corpus, taking dozens of relevant contextual factors into consideration in each case.

There is, however, another methodological gap that I attempt to fill. In spite of the fact that the multifunctionality of DMs is widely acknowledged in the literature, to my knowledge, there is no empirical research to date that has been performed in a way that allows for the multifunctionality of DMs both as linguistic items, *and* as individual tokens in naturally-occurring data. Thus, analysts, as a rule assign individual functions of DMs into one of a number of categories on an exclusive basis. In my analysis, however, I am going to look for *correlations* between individual tokens and the possible functions a given item can fulfill. In order to avoid the limitations a *corpus-driven* as opposed to a *corpus-based* approach entails, I am going to use previous research into the functions of both *well* and *of course* and use it as input into the categorization / indexing phase of my research.

The results of my research, in addition to mapping the functional spectrum of *well* and *of course* in televised interviews, will provide empirical basis to my claim that the discourse marker - pragmatic marker *dichotomy* is unjustified.

Chapter Three - *Empirical research on* well

3.1 Data and methodology

The corpus I compiled for the purpose of my study is a collection of transcripts taken from Larry King Live, the popular TV show broadcast on CNN (transcripts available at www.cnn.com). As a result, some reservations are due at this point. First of all, the results I have gained need to be considered in light of the fact that the corpus is representative of American English, secondly, the genre of TV interview also puts some constraints on the general validity of my findings across different discourse types. With regard to differences between my corpus and other corpora (usually based on surreptitious recordings of casual conversation) used in previous research the following obsevations are in order with reference to the dimensions described in 2.2.6:

- the degree of intimacy (dimension 2) between the interviewer and the interviewee is, naturally, lower than between friends or acquaintances but is kept relatively constant across various events, all of Larry King's interlocutors being famous people / public figures, etc.;
- in terms of dimensions 1, 9 and 10 (the extent the communication is made public, degree of spontaneity and degree of topic fixation) there are significant differences between televised interviews and casual conversation, on the basis of which I expected a lower incidence of *well* used for lexical search and for speech-monitoring functions as well as a lower D-value for *well* overall[91];
- in terms of dimensions 5, 6, 7 and (referential immediacy/distance; physical closeness in both space and time between interlocutors; degree of cooperation between interlocutors) there are no significant differences between the two types of discourse;

[91] the categorial multifunctionality of DMs is described in terms of their "D-function ratio" or D-value (a term proposed by Stenström 1990), i.e. in terms of their discourse function in relation to grammatical function. The D-value of *oh*, for example, is 100% in the London-Lund Corpus, since it is used exclusively as a DM, whereas *well* showed a D-item ratio of 86%.

- as for dimensions 3 and 4 (degree of emotional involvement on the part of interlocutors and extent to which the communicative process depends on the situational context, respectively) such factors depend to a great extent on the topic at hand, and cannot be kept constant in either coversations or televised interviews;
- dimension 8 (degree of dialogicity) puts further constraints on the degree of spontaneity in terms of turn-assignment and speaker roles.

The corpus I used in my research consists of 549,254[92] words, which is comparable in size to the London Lund Corpus (435,000 words) and to most of the corpora that have been used in connection with DMs (cf. Aijmer 1996 and 2002, Müller 2004, etc.). Throughout my analysis I used the Sisyphus Concordancer, created and developed by Ágoston Tóth, to whom many thanks are due.

Following Müller's (2004) research method, I performed a two-stage categorisation / indexing process. First, I looked for patterns in the usage of *well* in a test corpus consisting of one hundred randomly selected instances of *well*. The categories I used in the first, preliminary stage were based on the functions of *well* identified in previous research (described in **section 3.2**), thus serving as input for the categorisation system which I then developed based on the patterns found in the test corpus. In the second stage, this categorisation system was applied to all instances of *well*.

[92] ± 20.000 words as a result of transcription errors, site information notices and errors resulting from conversion into txt format.

3.2 Functions of well *based on previous research*

Schourup (2001) observes that *well* is probably the most widely investigated DM in the literature[93]. Accordingly, in an attempt to integrate a great variety of approaches to the discourse marker *well* in the course of identifying its various functions in naturally-occurring conversation, I drew on previous research in the field of conversation analysis (ethnomethodological as well as category-based approaches), Relevance Theory, coherence-based models, sociolinguistics / variation analysis, etc.

What follows is an overview of previous research on *well* with an eye on the different functions / uses individual scholars identified on the basis of corpora as well as constructed examples (occasionally illustrated by the individual authors' own examples), the items of which, as a second substage in the categorization process, I tried to systematize and correlate to each other.

3.2.1 Early accounts of well as a DM: Lakoff (1973) and Svartvik (1980)

One of the earliest accounts of *well* as a DM is found in Lakoff (1973), who observes that answers might be prefaced by *well* under the following conditions:

1. if the answer is an indirect one, i.e. if the respondent "is not giving directly the information the questioner sought" (Lakoff, 1973: 458);
2. if the information supplied with the utterance prefaced by *well* is only part of the answer (1973: 459);
3. in cases, where "the speaker senses some sort of insufficiency in his answer" (1973: 463).

[93] among the scolars who have contributed to the research on *well*, he lists Lakoff (1973); Halliday and Hasan (1976); Wierzbicka (1976); Hines (1978); Murray (1979); Svartvik (1980); Owen (1981); Warner (1983); Carlson (1984); Schourup (1985); Schiffrin (1985) and (1987); Bolinger (1989); Finell (1989); Watts (1986) and (1989); Fraser (1990); Jucker (1993) and (1997) and Greasley (1994), to which one might add Crystal and Davy (1975), Levinson (1983), Pomerantz (1984), de Klerk (2004) and Müller (2004)

Svartvik (1980) identifies the primary use of *well* as a "sharing device"[94]. He agrees with the functions Lakoff (1973) identified with regard to answers, and supplements them with a number of other functions, which he subsumes under two categories,

Well as a **qualifier**, indicates or marks:

1. agreement, positive reaction or attitude
2. reinforcement
3. the non-straight and incomplete answer to the wh-question
4. a non-direct or qualified answer[95].

Well as a **frame**

5. shifts the topic focus to one of the topics which have already been under discussion
6. introduces explanations, clarifications, etc.
7. indicates "the beginning of direct speech"
8. functions as "editing marker for self-correction"[96].

In addition, he claims that *well* also functions on the level of discourse techniques: "as floorholder, hesitator, or initiator" (p176).

3.2.2 Schiffrin (1985) and (1987); Schourup (1985)

Schiffrin views *well* in terms of its contribution to coherence and desribes *well*, as a device used by speakers to create coherence in the face of multiple options. She identifies the

[94] 1980: 168.
[95] Svartvik 1980: 173ff.
[96] Svartvik 1980: 174ff

"core meaning" of *well* as an anchoring device that is used by speakers at those points of the conversation where upcoming coherence is not guaranteed[97].

According to Schiffrin *well* is primarily a *response marker* used when the options offered through a prior utterance for the coherence of the upcoming response are not precisely followed[98]. She also states that *even* in cases when it is used *outside of question-answer sequences, well* locates a speaker as a *respondent* to one level of discourse. She identifies a whole range of sub-functions on the basis of her corpus compiled from sociolinguistic interviews, as listed in Appendix A.

Schourup (1985) labels *well* with the term evincive, which he defines as "a linguistic item that indicates that at the moment at which it is said the speaker is engaged in, or has just then been engaged in, thinking" (p18).

Most of Schourup's categories[99] correspond to the ones Schiffrin identified (e.g. *well* after deficient questions, as self-repair / other-repair, reluctance to speak, *well* in narratives), the following is a list of functions Schiffrin did not identify in her data:

3.2.2

***well* before exclamations:**

Well, I'm damned

3.2.3

***well* introducing quotations:**

Roger said, "**Well**, think it over and let me know Tuesday ."

3.2.4

***well* before topic shifts[100]:**

B :((talks about his new swimming pool))

A : Do you have the merger papers with you?

B : Yes . So I thought, "Nine fet? Sure, that's deep enough".

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[97] Schiffrin 1987: 126.
[98] Schiffrin 1987:127.
[99] Schourup's study is not aimed at identifying different uses of *well* per se, but to account for all occurrences within the framework of a single "Basic Interpretation Pattern".
[100] One could argue that this function corresponds to Schiffrin's *well* before skip-connecting to a certain extent.

A : **Well**, can we get started on this now?

B : Oh, sure . I'm sorry . The papers are right here .

3.2.3 The ethnomethodologist account of well

Within the framework of conversation analysis / ethnomethodology, the discourse marker *well* has been argued to be one of a set of markers or announcers of dispreferred seconds in adjacency pairs[101]. Accordingly, if a speaker disagrees with a statement, rejects an invitation or denies a request, etc., he/she is more likely to use the discourse marker *well* than if he/she agrees, accepts or complies.

Ethnomethodologists' notion of "dispreferred seconds" can be in many ways taken as an overarching category for several of the uses of *well* identified by Schiffrin (1987), namely

- *well* after utterances where the speaker's assumption is inaccurate
- *well* used to defer giving information
- *well* before unexpected responses

As Jucker and Smith (2002) observe, the treatment of *well* as a preface to dispreferred seconds also suggests a solution to the problem of full turn discourse marker *well*[102], since, as they argue, sometimes it is sufficient for a speaker to utter what she and her addressee recognize as *an announcer of a dispreferred second* to indicate that a preferred second will not be forthcoming (p152).

On the other hand, the association of *well* with dispreferred seconds and preference organization in general ties in nicely with face management and face threatening acts, since, according to Brown and Levinson (1987), an important feature of *preference organization* is that it makes possible a whole range of *face-preserving strategies* and techniques (p39).

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[101] cf. Levinson 1983:334; Pomerantz 1984:72, 99.
[102] this issue, they claim, is not handled very well by other scholars, including those who take an RT approach.

In addition, immediately after the first stage of indexing individual tokens of *well* in the test corpus, it became clear on the basis of additional contextual factors that, in the majority of cases, face management accompanies the utterrance of dispreferred seconds.

3.2.4 Relevance Theoretic accounts of well

As we saw in section 1.2.7.2, DMs[103] in relevance theoretic terms are said to convey procedural rather than conceptual meaning: they give processing instructions to the addressee in that they indicate how the utterance in which they occur is to be interpreted, thus reducing the processing effort needed for the addressee and increasing the degree of relevance of the entire utterance[104].

The discourse marker *well*, accordingly, "signifies that the most immediately accessible context is not the most relevant one for the interpretation of the impending utterance"[105] and cues the addressee that he/she has to *reconstruct the background* against which he can process the upcoming utterance.

Jucker also suggests four *specific* functions of *well*, all of which are sub-categories of the function of constraining the interpretation process of the following utterance.

The first function is labelled as "marking of insufficiency"; in this function, *well* indicates that the previous utterance needs to be modified or qualified. This microfunction corresponds to functions 8 and 11 identified by Schiffrin (*well* as self-repair and *well* before second thought, respectively) and also to Svartvik's category of "qualifier":

3.2.4.1

I don't know if I'm gonna take my Psychology final or not ... well, I know I hafta take one part of it, but the second part's optional.[106]

The second function of *well* Jucker identifies has to do with face management and mitigation[107] (cf. section 3.2.3); in this use, the problem with the previous utterances is on the

[103] In Relevance Theory the term *discourse connective* is used.
[104] cf. Andersen 1998, Blakemore 2002.
[105] Jucker 1993: 435.
[106] Jucker (1993) uses constructed examples borrowed from Svartvik (1980) and Lakoff (1973), therefore I prefer to use Fuller's (2003a) examples taken from a corpus of naturally-occurring spoken English.

interpersonal level. Fuller gives the following example, where speaker B mitigates a direct command with the DM *well*:

3.2.4.2 B: Her lips are moving way too fast. That's such a dumb commercial.

A: I've never seen this before

B: **Well**, look at it. (M3: conversation data)

The third function of *well* , according to Jucker, is to indicate *topic change* or introduce *direct reported speech* (cf. examples 3.2.3 and 3.2.4):

3.2.4.3 If you're a dog ... you have the same challenges as the rest of us ... just on a different scale. (to dog) Isn't that right, Shamus? You're a good boy. (3 second pause) **Well**, I don't know ... **well** ... (3 second pause) I'm about ready to go back to sleep, almost, I'm tired.

Finally, Jucker's fourth category corresponds to what previous research labelled as *lexical search* in that *well* can also function as a delay device, when a speaker is not sure how to respond or continue. This function is illustrated in examples 3.2.4.4 and 3.2.4.5. In 3.2.4.4, the interviewer is clearly searching for a new topic to pursue; in 3.2.4.5, the delay is brought about by the hesitance on the part of speaker B to choose a future place to go and live and teach.

3.2.4.4 **Well**, um, so what year are you in school?

3.2.4.5 A: Do you want to go, uh where would you like to go to teach? If you had your choice, to pick your favorite spot.

B: Uh, **well**, I like Japan.

---

[107] The inclusion of face management and mitigation might seem surprising in a primarily relevance theoretic account and Jucker does observe that "this analysis of well in terms of face-threat minimisation may seem to be more difficult to incorporate within a relevance-theoretical framework" (1993:444), but then (quoting Watts 1986) he goes on to argue that *well* is "a device available to the speaker for the minimization of a possible face-threat contingent on a failure (whether real or assumed) to abide by the axiom of relevance" (Watts 1986:58).

Another important contribution to the categorization of the various functions of *well* comes from Jucker and Smith (1998), who differentiate between reception and presentation markers, the former "are used to signal a reaction to information provided by another speaker", whereas presentation markers "accompany and modify the speaker's own information (p174). They claim that *well* can take either function[108] and illustrate their statement with the following examples (in 3.2.4.6 *well* is a presentation marker, in 3.2.4.7 it is a reception marker, while in 3.2.4.8, *well* serves both functions):

3.2.4.6 A: ***Well***, I think it's time to go.

3.2.4.7 A: Is it time to go?

B:***Well***...,

3.2.4.8 A: Is it time to go?

B: ***Well***, I think most people will be coming from across campus.

3.2.5 Well in narratives

Norrick (2001), using a corpus of audiotaped oral narratives, comes to the conclusion that the function of *well* in the oral narrative context follows neither from its usual meanings nor from its usual DM functions in other contexts.

Instead, *well* is "keyed on participant expectations about narrative structures and storytelling procedures" (p849). With the aid of excerpts from conversational narratives Norrick illustrates that

- *well* initiates and concludes narrative action;
- *well* guides listeners back to the main sequence of narrative elements following interruptions and digressions;

[108] Fuller wrongly claims that " Jucker and Smith (1998) categorize well as a presentation marker" (Fuller 2003:29).

- listeners can invoke *well* to re-orient the primary teller to the expected order of narrative presentation.

3.3 Research procedure, findings

After indexing all 100 tokens of *well* in the test corpus on the basis of all of the categories identified in the literature (as discussed in the previous section) I managed to narrow down the number of categories to 10 and also managed to identify a variety of *contextual cues* associated with the individual categories. The results are shown below in table 3.3.1.

Categories	Contextual cues
[1] topic shift/ topic management/ skip-connecting	metastatements e.g. "you know what", "before you go further", etc.
[2] mitigated disagreement / face management	vocative, direct reference to agreement, "but" (cf. token agreement "yes, but")[109]
[3] "agressive question", speaker is given no space by question	first pair part includes tagQ, "right?", yes-no question
[4] quote / shift of perspective	enquoters e.g. "he said...", "he went...", "I was like..."
[5] delay, lexical search	co-occurrence with "you know", "obviously" false starts pauses
[6] story preface, abstract, etc.	metastatements about the structure of the story, e.g. "first of all", "to cut a long story short", etc.
[7] contrast with previous statement/ question, unexpected, dispreferred second	negative structure, co-occurrence with *you know*, *but*, metastatements e.g. "guess what"
[8] turn management	interruption, overlapping turns
[9] "considered question"	*well* prefaces question
[0] non-DM use, adverbial, noun, in "as well as", etc.	syntactic position
[?] does not fit into any of the categories	N.A.

[109] when in doubt, I played back the relevant sections from the interviews and looked for paralinguistic signs such as eye-contact, gazing away etc.

table 3.3.1 categories and their contextual cues in the test corpus

In order to narrow down the above categories to fit the indexing requirements of a larger corpus, I did the following:

- I eliminated categories 8 and 9 because of the low frequency of occurrence of related items;
- I collapsed categories 1 and 6, since all tokens of *well* associated with those categories performed shifts of perspective and framing/ structuring functions (cf. Svartvik 1980).

As a result, I ended up with six generalised categories to be applied to the full corpus, as well as two "dummy categories", one for indexing non-DM uses of *well* (adverbs, nouns, *well* in *as well as*, etc.) and one for DM uses that did not readily fit into any of the six categories. Table 3.3.2 below gives an overview of the resulting categorisation system, showing the numbers, the abbreviations of the categories used for indexing, and a short explanation of each function.

[1]	TM	topic shift/ topic management/ skip-connecting, story preface, abstract, etc.
[2]	FTA	mitigated disagreement / face management
[3]	INSUFF	contrast with previous statement/ question, unexpected, dispreferred second
[4]	NOSP	"agressive question", speaker is given no space by question
[5]	DLS	delay, lexical search
[6]	QSP	quote / shift of perspective
[0]	NDM	non-DM use, adverbial or in "as well as"
[?]	RB	does not fit into any of the categories ("ragbag" category)

table 3.3.2. categories for stage 2 of indexing

As is clear from the above, there is a degree of overlap between the categories characteristic of the test corpus and the four functions of *well* Jucker (1993) identified, repeated here for convenience:

- insufficiency-marker: it indicates that the previous utterance needs to be modified or qualified
- face-threat mitigator: the problem with the previous utterance is on the interpersonal level
- topic change/reported speech indicator
- delay device.

Fuller (2003a) used the above categories in the course of her *one-stage indexing* process, (the results of her analysis can be seen in table 3.3.3), consequently, one could assume that, because of the overlap between some of the categories, her findings might be correlated with mine.

The functions of *well*

	Functions			
	Mark insufficiency	Mitigate face threat	Introduce reported speech/new topic	Delay
Interviews	37/65 57%	4/65 6%	9/65 14%	15/65 23%
Conversations	37/72 51%	0/72 0%	24/72 33%	11/72 15%

table 3.3.3 functions of *well*, adopted from Fuller 2003a: 42

In the course of indexing the test corpus, however, it became immediately apparent that in many cases there is *no one-to-one correspondence* between individual occurrences of *well* and a given category, as a result of the multifunctionality of *well* both in terms of *well* performing a variety of functions in discourse and a *single instance* of *well* simultaneously functioning on two or more planes of discourse.

It is easy to assign tokens to category 3, especially as, Larry King Live being a talkshow, there are a lot of situations when a new topic is introduced formally on the one hand and with formulaic expressions /conversational routines accompanying the use of *well* on the other (see examples 3.3.1 through 3.3.3):

3.3.1 **Well**, when we come back, everyone, we're going to find out from Tony Kovaelski what has become of the two men that threatened the life of the alleged victim in this case.

3.3.2 **Well**, when we come back, we're going to meet two baby cubs. We're going to have them right on the desk here.

3.3.3 ... **well**, let's get right to the current news of day.

Identifying tokens of the DM *well* that are used in connection with quoted speech (category [6]) is also a straight-forward task, as you can see in examples 3.3.4 through 3.3.6:

3.3.4 And I said, **well**, like for how long?

3.3.5 And I said, **Well** you're the one that put them through.

3.3.6 And I said, **well**, Miss Hepburn, I've just come back from the Middle East and interviewed people all over, and sometimes I don't see things in black and white, I see things in gray.

However, as is illustrated by examples 3.3.7 through 3.3.9, one would be hard put to find out which function is more salient, that of mitigating an FTA or the function of marking insuffiency. In fact, one of the most important findings of this part of my research is that the two usually go hand in hand. This applies to tokens such as the one in example 3.3.7, which, one might argue, might be considered a clear-cut case of category [3]. If we consider the speaker's as well as the hearer's face needs[110], however, it becomes quite clear that face management plays a significant role:

3.3.7 KING: You write them all?

MILCH: Well, I had a heavy hand in all of them.

3.3.8 KING: Do you think, Mary, as things are cyclical, folk music might come back?

[110] At this point I do not strictly adhere to Brown and Levinson's (1987) concept of face, as they do not incoporate modesty in their theory of politeness. Leech (1983) does, however, cf. the "modesty maxim", glossed as "minimize praise of self" (Leech 1983:132).

TRAVERS: Well, I don't think it's really left.

3.3.9 KING: How will you -- how did they get rid of the problem with you?

O. OSBOURNE: Well, you don't get rid of the problem. The problem is always there.

As a result of the above considerations, contrary to Fuller's methodology, instead of assigning each token to only one of the five categories, I looked for *correlations* between individual occurrences of *well* and the contextual cues of all six categories identified both in the literature and in course of the testing phrase of my own research. The results of *manually indexing* the full corpus are summarized in figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 below:



figure 3.3.1 categorization of tokens of *well* in full corpus, total number of occurrences: 1839



figure 3.3.2 categorization of tokens of *well* in full corpus, results shown in percentages

A revised list of co-occurrence patterns is given in table 3.3.4 below:

table 3.3.4 contextual cues / co-occurrence patterns in the full corpus

Categories / functions	**Contextual cues, co-occurrence patterns**
[1a] topic shift/ topic management/ skip-connecting	(1) metastatements: *you know what* *before you go further* *let's examine/take a look* *as I said* *as I was saying* (2) co-occurrence with global DM *anyway*
[1b] story preface, abstract, etc.	(1) metastatements about the structure of the story: *first of all* *to cut a long story short* *firstly* *here's an example* (2) "story-time adverbials": *the other day* *an hour later* (3) co-occurrence with *and* in DM function
[2] mitigated disagreement / face management	(1) co-occurrence with vocatives (2) direct reference to agreement (3) co-occurrence with *but* (cf. token agreement *yes, but*) (4) co-occurrence with hedges: *sort of* *I think / suppose* *I just...* *I thought* *typically, basically, technically*
[3] contrast with previous statement/ question, unexpected, dispreferred second	(1) negative structure *well, you don't / I don't* (2) co-occurrence with *you know*, *but* (3) metastatements e.g. *guess what* (4) channel cues e.g. *listen, look*
[4] "agressive question", speaker is given no space by the questioner	(1) first pair part includes tagQ, "right?", yes-no question (2) co-occurrence in left context with *of course* (3) right-context *maybe* (4) *well, yes* (signals insuffiency in first pair part)
[5] delay, lexical search	(1) co-occurrence with *you know*, *obviously, I mean* (2) false starts (3) pauses (4) opting out, co-occurrence with *I don't know*
[6] quote / shift of perspective	enquoters: *he said...* *he went...* *I was like...*
[7] ragbag	emphatic *well* e.g. "well, thank you" *well* in considered responses e.g. "well, I'm happy to..."
[0] non-DM use, adverbial or in "as well as"	syntactic position

3.4 Conclusions, a possible direction for further research

In addition to the findings summarized in tables 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 in the previous section, I propose the following:

- The D-value of *well* is 77.54%[111] in the present corpus as compared to 86% in the London-Lund Corpus[112], which indicates that my predictions about the differences between televised interviews and casual conversations in terms of the 9 dimensions were right with regard to D-item ratios;
- When approaching DMs from an empirical perspective it is important to account for their multifunctionality (contra Fuller:2003a), more specifically, the fact that markers may simultaneously fulfill a variety of functions, thus there is a need to account for individual occurrences of DMs that *cut across functional categories*;
- The high ratio of turn-initial DMs in second pair parts of adjacency pairs (1044 tokens of *well*, i.e. 73.21% of all D-items occurred in this position) suggests that *well* functions primarily at the level of the exchange structure (interactional level), which is also born out by Schiffrin's research, who calls 'well' a response marker used "when the options offered through a prior utterance for the coherence of the upcoming response are not precisely followed" (Schiffrin 1987:127). Parallel to Stenström's notion of D-value, I suggest the term I-value or interactional value in terms of which a particular DM's function at the level of the exchange structure can be described.

Although the study of the distribution of DMs at large is beyond the scope of the present study, by way of illustrating that the notion of I-value might prove to be useful in further research I indicate some examples for DMs' I-values in my corpus. The value is calculated as a quotient of the number of occurrences a given item occurs turn-initially in second-pair part position (and as a feedback signal, where relevant) and the total number of its occurrences as DM in the corpus:

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[111] In a previous study, where I used a corpus of exactly the same size, but on the basis of different editions of Larry King Live, *well* showed an even lower D-value of 71.66%.
[112] cf. Aijmer 2002:27 and Stenström 1990:162.

and	18.3%
because	27.66%
but	30.18%
of course	36.44%
oh	73.6%[113]
so	34.14%
well	73.21%
yeah	84.75%
yes	96.93%

[113] This value is not surprising, after all, since, despite the fact that *oh* functions primarily on the cognitive plane (cf. Schiffrin 1987:127), both *well* and *oh* are primarily response markers (ibid.).

Chapter Four - *Of course* does, of course, mark new information - an empirical approach to *of course*

4.1 Previous research, functions of of course

Unlike the DM *well*, which, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, is probably the most widely investigated DM in the literature, *of course* attracted my attention because of its relatively neglected status. It would be an exaggeration to say that *of course* is hardly mentioned at all in the literature on DMs, but in most cases, when *of course* appears, it is tucked neatly away under a convenient label and is usually forgotten, as is exemplified by Fraser's (1999) summary treatment, who simly lists *of course* with a great number of other linguistic items he labels as *inferential markers*, i.e. markers signalling that the disocurse segment that follows is to be taken as a conclusion based on the preceding discourse segment.

Fuller (2003b) describes the process whereby individual DMs were selected for her analysis. As a first step, DMs are identified on the basis of two criteria:

- if the DM is removed from the utterance, the semantic relationship between the elements it connects must remain the same.
- without the DM, the grammaticality of the utterance must still be intact[114].

At this point, *of course* is still in the game. As a second step, however, *frequency* counts of thirteen different DMs meeting the criteria given above were made in her corpus. Of the original thirteen, seven DMs comprise less than 1 percent of the total number of DMs in her data, and are thus eliminated from the study for lack of salience in the corpus[115]. The markers are: *right, let's see, alright, wow,* ***of course****, gosh, okay*, and *actually*. The winning DMs are *well, oh, y'know, like*, and *I mean* on account of appearing more frequently, and fitting the DM criteria more clearly.

[114] Fuller 2003b:186.
[115] 2003b:187.

However, not everyone would agree with Fraser's and Fuller's treatment of *of course*, both of whom presume that *of course* is a non-propositional DM. In yet another article where *of course* makes a short appearance, Bach (1999) mentions two categories of expression which, when they occur in sentence-initial position, might seem to be utterance modifiers but are in fact *content modifiers*:

1. implicatives: as a result, consequently, hence, in that case, so, therefore, thus
2. assessives: amazingly, coincidentally, disappointingly, (un)expectedly, (un)fortunately, incredibly, inevitably, ironically, luckily, naturally, obviously, oddly, **of course**, predictably, regrettably, sadly, surprisingly, undoubtedly (1999:352ff)

Bach argues that these "locutions" do not comment on the main act of utterance but rather contribute to the content of the utterance, then goes on to quote Bellert, who has suggested (1977:342), that sentences containing assessives (which she calls "factive"), are used to express two propositions,

- the proposition expressed by the matrix sentence and
- the proposition that the fact stated by that proposition has the property expressed by the assessive.

Accordingly, Bach would argue[116] that the sentence 4.1.1 expresses the proposition that "Walkabout won the Kentucky Derby" and the proposition that the fact that "Walkabout won the Kentucky Derby" was not surprising:

4.1.1 *Of course*, Walkabout won the Kentucky Derby.

Bach's conclusion is that *of course* together with the other adverbs on the list of assessives are different from a modal adverb such as *certainly*, which, when used in the

[116] He picks a different assessive for illustration, but his line of argument is preserved intact.

same sentence, expresses only one proposition, that "it is certain that Walkabout won the Kentucky Derby":

4.1.2 Certainly Walkabout won the Kentucky Derby.

In other words, a speaker of 4.1.2 says just one thing, whereas a speaker of 4.1.1 says two.

In addition to the above studies where *of course* is briefly mentioned, there are two articles that treat the subject of the pragmatic status of *of course* at some length, one is Olga Bársony's "Of course - A pragmatic awareness exercise" (Bársony:1997), the other is "Hedges and boosters in women's and men's speech" by Janet Holmes (Holmes:1990). Therefore, in what follows, I am going to follow their footsteps in a quest for the various uses *of course* can be put to and in deciding if *of course* is, indeed primarily propositional or not.

Bársony uses the following two utterances as a starting point:

4.1.3 You have, of course, heard that a TWA plane has blown up in mid-air just off New York... (uttered in one of the programmes of SKY NEWS , in the genre of "breaking news").

4.1.4 Mrs. Blair is, of course, a true Liverpudlian. (the source is again Sky News, one of the programmes covering the then current election campaign).

She argues that such tokens of *of course* are seemingly incongruous in such "highly serious, formal contexts" (p201) and there is a huge difference between the use of *of course* in sentences 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 and the definition of Longman Guide to English Usage, according to which *"of course* is used to suggest that a piece of out-of-the-way knowledge is commonplace", since the utterer of 4.1.4, for example, cannot possibly expect all TV viewers to know whether Mrs. Blair is or isn't a true Liverpudlian.

In a quest of accounting for the use of *of course* in the above utterances, Bársony gives an overview of explications put forward by guides to English usage, comprehensive grammars, dictionary definitions, etc. (see below), and after finding all of them insufficient in some respect, she hypothesizes that *of course* in such cases can be accounted for in terms of

face management and *Face Threatening Acts* (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987), presenting her argument in the following 8 steps and arriving at the conclusion in 9:

1. since broadcasting (ever) more recent news is a privilege of the media, the newsreaders of a TV news programme (breaking news, updates) amount to being intrinsically face-threatening acts,
2. since TV stations are there to inform and entertain their viewers, their representatives have to be deferential in their ways of addressing the public,
3. in the case of an FTA the speaker has one of two options: do the FTA or not do it at all,
4. news reporters are in no position to opt out of doing the FTA since a newsreader, by its very nature, "thrives" on bringing newer and newer bits of news,
5. they cannot go bald on record either, so they are are basically left with the option of doing the FTA with redressive action, using markers of either positive or negative politeness,
6. by uttering *of course* the news reporter applies the strategy of positive politeness, (conveying the meta-message that Speaker wants Hearer's wants),
7. since claiming common knowledge does seem to be an expedient way of asserting/ establishing common ground, a personal centre-switch takes place, transferring from Speaker to Hearer: Speaker speaks as if Hearer were Speaker, or Hearer's knowledge were equal to Speaker's knowledge,
8. by doing so, Hearer (and whoever s/he represents) generously extends the circle of "knowers" to include the hearers,
9. in this treatment, then, *of course* is a marker of co-operative hearer-oriented behaviour[117].

Similarly, Holmes (1990) approaches *of course* from the perspective of *face management* and *illocutionary force* modification. She observes that the fact that *of course* has not received due attention in post-Lakoff language and gender research, (and in the

[117] line of argument taken from Bársony 1997: 205.

literature on pragmatic force modification in general) underlines "the arbitrary nature of the features selected for attention by researchers" (p190).

Holmes observes that although *of course* is consistently emphatic in effect, it appears to signal different types of meaning depending on the context, and goes on to identify three different uses of *of course*, namely *of course* as a BOOSTER; IMPERSONAL *of course* and CONFIDENTIAL *of course.* Similarly to Bársony (1997: 204), Holmes associates one of the uses of *of course* with the function of the DM *you know* in that both can be markers of "meta-knowledge about accepted 'consensual truths' or undisputed 'generally shared knowledge', attitudes or beliefs"[118].

As a result, on the basis of Bársony's and Holmes's articles, we can draw the following list of the possibles functions / uses *of course* can be put to:

- *of course* is useful at times to avoid suggesting that someone is ignorant or stupid when "you tell them something they ought to know but you are not sure" (source: The Longman Guide to English Usage and the Good English Guide) as in 4.1.5:
  4.1.5 Your car insurance must, *of course,* be renewed every year.
- *of course* used when "you are mentioning something that you think other people already know , or should know" (source: Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English)
- *of course as* a content disjunct (source: Quirk et al.:1990)

  4.1.6 *Of course,* nobody imagined that she will repay what she borrowed[119]. (p.622)
- *of course* as a subjunct / emphasizer, (it may have the reinforcing effect on the truth value of the clause or part of the clause to which it applies. Bársony 1997:203)
- *of course* in the resultive subcategory of conjunct (cf. Fraser's "inferential markers"):

  4.1.7 She arrived late, gave answers in an offhand manner, and *of course* displeased the interviewing panel (Quirk 1990:638).
- *of course* in a concessive meaning (a subcategory of subjuncts):

[118] Holmes 1990:190.
[119] As Bársony comments, "disjuncts of this type convey some evaluation of, or attitude towards what is said. They are also called attitudinal disjuncts in that they convey the speaker's comment on the content of what s/he is saying" (Bársony 1997:203).

4.1.8 She hoped he would not mention her unfortunate marriage. It /That would be very courteous of him in a way, *of course* (Quirk et al. 1990:1464) (where *of course* is parallel to ... though).

- *of course* as a BOOSTER emphasizes the proposition being expressed (cf. *of course* as an emphasizer):
  4.1.9 Interviewee A to interviewer B in A's office.
  no I I I don't believe (laugh) that / / competition was essential / of course it's essential/ I wouldn't go out and play tennis if I didn't want to win the game[120].

- IMPERSONAL *of course*, glossed 'as is common knowledge' or 'as everyone knows', in terms of its position in the utterance, according to Holmes, it tends to occur medially or finally:
  4.1.10 Context: male radio interviewee discussing Watergate.
  they were all telling lies of course // which meant the issue was even more confused.[121]

- CONFIDENTIAL *of course*, glossed 'as you know on the basis of information or experience we have shared' or 'as you might deduce, given our shared attitudes', it also signals "the status of knowledge, or beliefs as shared by the speaker and hearer, but the assumed knowledge or beliefs are personal and specific to a particular social network. The assumptions are based on previous contact, shared information and membership of an in-group". Holmes also observes that the information or attitudes referred to are often introduced "as an 'aside' in a narrative, with *of course* functioning to signal the status of the proposition as mutual pre-existing knowledge" (ibid.):
  4.1.11 Context: woman recounting past experience to daughter in the home.
  he said well now I c/ I can't do it before Christmas// but of course this was about a fortnight before Christmas anyway/ and he said ...

In terms of *contextual / co-occurrence cues* to the particular function *of course* takes, both Bársony and Holmes identify certain aspects of both the linguistic and the non-linguistic context; however, while Holmes seems to assume that a relaxed, friendly encounter

[120] Holmes 1990:190.
[121] ibid.

automatically entails the likelihood of *of course* appearing as a marker of positive politeness, Bársony's account cautions us against taking such generalizations, and draws attention to the dynamic features of the context that can determine whether *of course* is a signal of *positive* or *negative* politeness.

Other valuable contextual clues identified by Holmes are, as in the case of most DMs, the position of *of course* in the utterance and the various intonational contours it can receive.

4.2 Of course *in the Larry King corpus*

Having identified some of the possible functions and contextual cues *of course* is associated with in the literature, I looked at the Larry King corpus for further clues to the use of *of course* in naturally-occurring spoken English.

Because of the relatively small number of occurrences (there were altogether 225 tokens of *of course* in my Larry King corpus[122]), instead of a quantitative analysis, similar to the one in chapter 3, I decided to perform a qualitative analysis and identify the most salient features of *of course* as a discourse marker.

In the following, I present the functions / co-occurrence patterns associated with *of course* that are salient in the Larry King corpus:

- interactional function of *of course*: *of course* used in a second pair part as a response marker, marking strong agreement/disagreement:

4.2.1 KING: Do you think any less of him as a godfather?

HICKS: *Of course* not.

4.2.2 KING: Six to 10:00 she's going to do. I mean, can you see her back in the swing of things? Back in the ...

STEWART: *Of course*.

4.2.3 KING: Did you ever think that Martha did anything wrong, or did you ever say to yourself that somewhere Martha did something, or are you totally believing in her innocence?

PLIMPTON: *Of course* I believe that she's innocent. You know, we're all capable of making mistakes...

[122] The same corpus I used in the previous study of *well.*

4.2.4 KING: Do you favor their right to do it?

MAHER: *Of course*! Again, we've talked about this, but it wouldn't even be an issue without the religious part of it.

4.2.5 KING: You go around thinking of things like this?

STEWART: *Of course*. That's my job.

4.2.6 KOSTYRA: I got along with everybody.

KING: Even her husband?

KOSTYRA: *Of course*. We loved him.

- *of course* as **feedback signal**:

4.2.7 WALTERS: You know, these are the toughest questions for me to answer, because I can never tell you what my favorite celebrity [sic]. I've done so many between the specials and "20/20." And you -- the interesting thing about celebrity interviews, which you know, too, Larry, is that you're able to get to know them and ask them questions that you could never probably ask in years.

KING: *Of course*.

4.2.8 KING: Give it any thought, because that was a big rumor ...

STEWART: *Of course*.

4.2.9 EVANS: It's hard. It's hard. And it was hard with John. And it was hard with Yanni. Because love doesn't stop...

KING: *Of course*.

- *of course* associated with **lists / sequences**, where *of course* gives relevance to the item in the list it precedes (co-occurrence with *and* functioning as coordinator in left context):

4.2.10 You see Condoleezza Rice the national security advisor, Mary Madeline and *of course*, me.

4.2.11 We expect all three of the major candidates to be with us, that would be Dean, Edwards, and *of course*, Kerry, and we also will have as our experts in studio, former senators Bob Dole and George Mitchell, both of whom led their respective parties in the Senate.

4.2.12 KING: Boy, what a night. I'll be back live at midnight, 9:00 Pacific with another hour of LARRY KING LIVE, and *of course* a complete show tomorrow night, looking at the Green River serial killer.

4.2.13 EISNER: You were just there? It's a great piece of Disney. I suggest you go there. But there are other stores, and *of course*, there are the parks.

4.2.14 We'll be on top of the scene with Bob Woodward and Bob Dole, and Wolf Blitzer. And *of course*, candidates as guests, and then a second show as well with more guests.

- *of course* in stories; *of course* signals new development, prominent element in the **story structure** as well as **side sequences** (co-occurrence with *and* functioning as discourse marker in left context):

4.2.15 I said Judy, he's gone. And *of course* that was a moment where a whole phase of everything ends. And, I mean, I don't know....

4.2.16 Watching Polly and the babies come out of the window, it sounds strange, it was almost like watching people be born. It was -- Polly passed the babies through the windows, and *of course* they just thought that was a lot of fun, to come out the window. And to have grammy standing outside the window. That was great. But when Polly -- when Polly came out of the window, it was -- it was just stark terror on her face. It didn't start off that way, Larry. It started out as a journal. My grandkids were always saying to me, "Nana, tell me about how it was when you were young." And *of course*, when I grew up right after the Great Depression, so there weren't a lot of colorful, exciting stories to tell them. And I think they always felt maybe I was evading my past.

4.2.17 I was born with congenital hearing loss, and I've depended on lip reading all my life. And so when I applied for the makeover, it was in order to get Lasik so that I could see better, to help me with the lip reading. And *of course*, my teeth were deteriorating. I was hoping to have a nicer smile. And the surprise was that they also gave me the new Senso Diva hearing aids by Widex.

4.2.18 Well, you know, saying good night, you know. I was leaving the back stage and he got up and, you know, like anything. And *of course*, I said no. And I was 17 when I first met him, but you know, she just can't believe that, that I would turn down a kiss from Elvis Presley, but I remember my dad telling me on the way up there, he said, "Now, Tanya, remember, he said, that Elvis, he can get any girl he wants, you know." So I thought, well, any girl but me.

4.2.19 The jurors right now are being asked a number of questions about their exposure to the media. And some of those questions will have to do with what Mark Geragos had to say about the case, but I distinctly recall Mark Geragos saying nothing more than that there was probable cause to bind this case over for trial. And *of course* the case was bound over for trial. I'd never heard him comment to the effect that he thought Scott Peterson was guilty.

4.2.20 I was home watching a certain show, where Jack Welch, who's a great guy, was being interviewed. And they interrupted the program to say that this had happened. It was, you know, 8:45 or so in the morning, and I was listening to Jack, who I love. I think he's a great guy. And I'm saying, What's this? And they showed a picture of the World Trade Center with this incredible flame pouring out of the side. And you know, you knew it couldn't be a boiler. That's down in the basement. You know, you're saying, What is this? What could be possibly this? And *of course*, as the second plane hit, which I witnessed because the building I was in was very high and looked directly at the World Trade Center, you said, Well, now you know what it is. But what a terrible, terrible period of time that was.

- *of course* in **information management**; as the following examples illustrate, *of course,* in many cases, is in fact used to signal new information and/or the newsworthiness of a given utterance, rather than the fact that "the status of knowledge, or beliefs" are "shared by the speaker and hearer" (Holmes 1990:190) and can neither be glossed "as is common knowledge"; "as everyone knows" nor "as you and I both know on the basis of previous experience", respectively (ibid.):

4.2.21 And certainly in the terms of our broadcast, in terms of following Paul's life as he travels and he preaches and he wrestles with these ideas until the time of his death or disappearance -- because some people believe he didn't die, *of course*, at the hands of the Romans, but may have disappeared into Spain.

4.2.22 In think probably England is the only country where a woman will kiss another woman's hand. And indeed, it is only with the sovereign that you do that. But *of course*, you don't actually kiss her hand, you will kiss your own thumb. You take her hand and then kiss your thumb.

4.2.23 The second way it reduces the war on terrorism is by inflaming the Islamic world and helping, as Rumsfeld said in his internal memo, helping create more terrorists more rapidly than we can capture or kill them, because of the hatred in the Islamic world

generated against the United States by our needless invasion of Iraq. And the third way, *of course*, was it actually took troops and intelligence assets away from the hunt for bin Laden.

4.2.24 A: So I don't know why anybody would think it was a good idea for him to do that, after his failure at the House and why would they want him to be vice president with that experience?

B: Well, *of course*, there's a long history of that in the United States. Abraham Lincoln was elected to the House once. He retired because he faced certain defeat.

In 4.2.24, the fact that *of course* appears in answer to a quest for information makes it especially obvious that speaker B either protects speaker A's face by using *of course* or simply uses it to give weight to his considered opinion.

- *of course* associated with **personal-centre switches**[123]; as observed in Bársony (1997), the use of *of course* co-occurring with personal-center switches can be associated with positive politeness strategies, in addition, in my corpus, there are several cases, where the combination of *of course* and a personal-center switch marks "agressive questions" (cf. previous chapter) and persuasion / manipulation of the interlocutor[124]:

4.2.25 Yes, but I don't want people to think that we are only in this for a blood And to watch the government try to deal with it is a fascinating exercise. Then *of course* ***you*** realize that Ecstasy's been around since the early part of the century and has been used before in the 1950s and 1960s by psychotherapists in California as a drug treatment.

[123] cf. Brown and Levinson 1987:119ff.
[124] this observation echoes Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen's (2004) claim that *of course* is frequently used by politicians for rhetorical reasons and "to express knowledgeability and certainty (epistemic stance) as part of their role as persuaders" (p1785).

4.2.26 ***You*** have to remember, *of course*, Larry, that the people in this country have spent decades under a repressive political regime, and also under a command economy, where they were told what they must do.

4.2.27 In your mind, I know you've been very critical of Mr. Condit, is he still involved in your opinion? It would just be opinion at this point, *of course*?

4.3 Conclusions, the status of **of course** *as a discourse marker*

As is clear from the examples above, despite the fact that the non-saliency and peripheral status of *of course* as a discourse marker is frequently observed in the literature[125], *of course* displays a whole range of the (formal and functional) properties of the category of DMs, such as

- non-propositionality (contra Bach 1999);
- variable scope (cf. co-occurrence with *and* as coordinator as opposed to co-occurrence with *and* as discourse marker);
- multifunctionality (it simultaneously marks new information and illocutionary force mitigation e.g. in 4.2.24 above);
- context- and genre-dependence (*of course* recurrently appears at certain narrative segments similarly to oral narrative markers[126]; its dominant use depends on the text type e.g. in argumentative discourse it is primarily associated with personal centre-switches used for rhetorical reasons);
- procedural meaning (cf. its non-compositionality and the unreliability of native speakers' intuitions about its use[127]);
- weak clause association (cf. the treatment of *of course* as a disjunct in Quirk et al. 1990);
- connectivity / textuality (contra Andersen:2001)[128]; **evidentiality**[129] as the core meaning of *of course* (marking that the utterence in its focus is in line with expectations) ensures that *of course* contributes to *argument- and narrative structure* as well as inferencing in general.

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[125] mostly on account of its infrequent use.
[126] cf. González 2004:339.
[127] mentioned both in Bársony:1997 and Holmes:1990.
[128] Andersen claims that "it makes sense to single out markers that have textual features (contribute to and express coherence relations) as opposed to those that do not" (Andersen 2001:60); *of course* according to him belongs to the latter group.
[129] I use the term in the sense that Chafe (1986) defined it, who lists a whole range of linguistic devices that signal "expectations of some kind, against which knowledge must be matched" (p270) and lists *of course* among such devices.

In addition, the diachronic development of *of course* ulso underscores its status as a DM. Lewis (2000) observes that *of course* has undergone a unidirectional process of semantic change involving greater subjectification, increased discourse function, increased scope and gradual conventionalization of implicatures. Lewis also argues that the emergence of *of course* as a DM was conditioned by "the co-occurrence of an adverbial expression with particular sequences of coherence relations and with particular patterns of information structure" (ibid.). Lewis traces the transition of *of course* via successive functional splits and reanalyses, from proposition-level adverbial in Early Modern English (4.3.1) to multifunctional particle in Present Day English (4.3.2).

4.3.1 A pardon ... which either is graunted of course, or ye kyng of pytee and compassion geveth (1548)

4.3.2 the economic situation is disastrous now ... and the drought of course has made it worse (PDE)[130].

[130] Lewis's (2000) own examples.

General conclusions, directions for further research

In the introduction I observed that despite a rapidly growing body of research on DMs there are still a number of fundamental questions that need to be answered. The problems include the lack of generally accepted terminologies and classifications; uncertainty regarding essential formal, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics; the absence of a model in which pragmatic markers can be related to general linguistic categories in an integrated way.

In my dissertation I argued that the theoretical challanges DMs pose are due to their multifunctionality both as linguistic items and as individual tokens in naturally-occurring discourse, as well as the heterogeneity of the functional class of DMs. As a result, individual items cannot be put into formal-functional straitjackets and do not display taxonomical relations.

In my dissertation, I offered an alternative to categorizing DMs along the lines of *dichotomies* such as inherent meaning - context-dependent meaning, truth-functional content- non-truth functional content, conceptual encoding - procedural encoding, and, most importantly, along the lines of the discourse marker - pragmatic marker dichotomy. I suggested that such distinctions should be viewed, instead, as *continua* and the class of DMs is best conceptualized as a *radial* category, whose members differ with respect to prototypicality, as well as display the properties of the functional class to *varying degrees*.

The motivation behind such conceptualization of DMs is the fact that individual DMs are in the process of undergoing grammaticalization, and they differ with respect to how much progress they have made along various grammaticalization *clines*. The closer they are to the end of the cline, the more properties of the functional class of DMs they display, and, as a result, the closer they are to being *core / prototypical* members.

Thus, in my dissertation, I presented the outline of a model that represents DMs as a *graded category* and analysed certain items in terms of being core or peripheral members of that category. One obvious direction for further research is going to be extending the number of items that are placed in the model and discovering additional properties that the class of DMs display and which hold individual members within the category.

An important corollary of the above argument is that the formal, functional and stylistic properties that DMs display can be accounted for as results of or as triggers to their grammaticalization in terms of

(a) the clines that have been suggested in grammaticalization research:

content level > epistemic level > illocutionary level > textual level[131]

propositional > textual > expressive[132];

(b) the concomitant processes of grammaticalization and pragmaticalization which include:

- decategorialization
- scope changes
- phonological reduction
- subjectification
- syntactic disjunction
- semantic bleaching and parallel pragmatic strengthening.

By way of concluding empirical research (presented in Part II) on the DMs *well* and *of course* (my choice was motivated by a wish to include a salient, core member, and an allegedly infrequent, peripheral member of the category of DMs), let me reiterate the following:

- when approaching DMs from an empirical perspective it is important to take full account of their multifunctionality; in other words, one needs to account for tokens of DMs that cut across functional categories;
- similarly to D-value (or discourse value) coined by Stenström (1990), the interactional or I-value of DMs (a term I introduced to represent the quotient of the number of occurrences a given item occurs turn-initially in second-pair part position[133], and the total number of its occurrences as a DM in the corpus) appears to be a useful concept when comparing the distribution of DMs across a range of

[131] Crevels 2000:320.
[132] Traugott: 1995.
[133] and as a feedback signal, where relevant.

contexts or for the purpose of studying individual DMs in terms of their genre-dependence;

- my study of *of course* and *well* in Part II also suggests that the pragmatic marker - discourse marker *dichotomy* is not empirically justifiable as individual tokens simultaneously signal textual and interpersonal functions.

Some of the most obvious directions for further empirical research include the study of a wider selection of items, across a wider range of contexts, discourse types and genres, in a variety of languages, which would include e.g. the study of "Hungarian tinting particles"[134]. It would also be interesting to consider contrasting patterns of DM use in language learners' and native speakers' speech, which, to date, has been a neglected area of research.

[134] cf. e.g. Péteri:2001.

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Appendix A Functions of *well* in Schiffrin (1987)

(1)

***well* after utterances where the speaker's assumption is inaccurate:**

Freda: How m- long has your mother been teaching?

Debby: **Well** she hasn't been teaching that long.

(2)

***well* as disagreement minimizer:**

Zelda: Are you from Philadelphia?

Sally: **Well** I grew up uh out in the suburbs. And then I lived for about seven years up in upstate New York. And then I came back here t'go to college.

(3)

***well* used in reaction to an insufficiently broad wh-question:**

Debby: You can ... tell somebody's from South Philly?

Zelda: Sometimes y'can.

Henry: I can. **Well**, if one if they use it, then I can, if they don't use it, then I don't!

Irene: I-I don't really know.

(4)

information search:

Sally: But otherwise, you lived in West Philly. Whereabouts?

Zelda: **Well**, I was born at Fifty second and em tsk...oh I forgo- **well** I think it's Fifty second and Chew.

(5)

***well* before skip-connecting:**

Debby: Yeh. Yeh it's about fifteen minutes from West Philadelphia.

Ira: **Well** uh a- another th- thing that I took in consideration I was working at the Navy Yard at the time [continues]

(6)

***well* before story abstract:**

Debby: What happened?

Zelda: **Well**... at one time he was a very fine doctor. And he had two terrible tragedies. [story follows]

(7)

***well* used to defer giving information:**

Debby: What does your daughter in law call you?

Zelda: **Well** that's a sore spot. My older daughter in law does call me Mom.

My younger daughter in law right now is a- to nothing.

(8)

***well* as self-repair:**

Debby: Do you ever go down in the winter?

Zelda: No. **Well** we go down but our house is closed.

(9)

***well* used after a form (here, tag-question) that restricts hearers' response options:**

Debby: That's quite a neighborhood, isn't it?

Irene: *Yeh* ***well***[135] I don't really have too much trouble

(10)

***well* before unexpected responses:**

Sally : Are there any topics that you like in particular about school, or none.

Lon: **Well** gym!

(11)

***well* before second thought:**

Sally: Do you think you get more common sense as you grow older, or

[135] Schiffrin does not differentiate between individual occurrences of *well* and *well* in DM clusters, as in *yeah well*. Example 9, therefore, needs to be considered with reservations.

Zelda: No, **well**, no. Uh, if you have it, you have it.

(12)

***well* used to elicit information that previous questions failed to elicit:**

Debby: How did you get the name of the doctor you're using now? Where'd y'find him?

Zelda: **Well** y'mean our family doctor?

Debby: Yeh. **Well** how did y'find him?

(13)

***well* before a request for clarification**

Debby: How did you get the name of the doctor you're using now? Where'd y'find him?

Zelda: **Well** y'mean our family doctor?

Debby: Yeh. **Well** how did y'find him?

Appendix B *Well* in the test corpus

Legend:
[1] topic shift/ topic management/ skip-connecting
[2] mitigated disagreement / face management
[3] "agressive question", speaker is given no space by question
[4] quote / shift of perspective
[5] delay, lexical search
[6] story preface, abstract, etc.
[7] contrast with previous statement/ question, unexpected, dispreferred second
[8] turn management
[9] "considered question"
[0] non-DM use, adverbial or in "as well as"
[?] does not fit into any of the categories

Left context	**KW**	**Right context**	**Cat.**
strikes at the beginning of adulthood. KING: Does it have an effect on sex? WILLIAMS:	Well	you will, before you go further, we've started to see that the numbers of the ages of people	[1]
is not a killer, it's not a death notice, why did you want to kill yourself? WILLIAMS:	Well	, you know what, that's the thing that is so strange about this illness. For about two percent,	[1]
you see everyday on the air, because it's uncomfortable. KING: Back to a big question.	Well	, could there be a president with MS? WILLIAMS: Yes, that's right. KING: But he couldn't	[1]
to be partisan here but with the Democrats saying it's not enough, it's not enough.	Well	, to me a little bit in the step in the right direction is better than no step at all. And this	[1]
beginning. I have some other on DAVID LETTERMAN, HOST, "LATE NIGHT WITH DAVID LETTERMAN":	Well	, you heard about, I guess. Early in the week, George W. Bush, our president, is calling for a	[1]
don't have the talent or the drive or the passion to make a movie. So yes, it's negative.	Well	, thank you for identifying the elephant in the room and then reviewing the fly that's on its	[1]
like George Washington a lot better, OK? Let me make that clear. But I don't understand --	well	to answer that question, first, I think the reason they haven't gotten him is because he's	[1]
GRACE: Hey, Susan... MCDOUGAL: ... and you want to fight the charges. ZELDIN:	Well	, but Susan -- Susan, you... GRACE: Susan McDougal, question... ZELDIN: ... went to trial and	[2]
began to build. And again, when the verdict was delivered, it was very shocking. GRACE:	Well	, Chris Pixley, I felt the buzz on Thursday because you and I know from trying cases, you're	[2]
not as educated as Dr. Hauser and they don't really know the latest and... BARONDESS:	Well	, the symptoms, Larry, are different for everyone and probably a lot of the ones that Dr. Hauser	[2]
KING: Because I'm not sure she prays for herself. Martha's not a prayer.	Well	, but I think inwardly she has some kind of a force. She may not call it	[2]

KOSTYRA:		religion, but she has a	
right? STEWART: There comes a time -- no, but she'll still say she's in control. KING:	Well	, I know this wasn't easy for you, Martha, and I appreciate you coming. STEWART: Well, I love	[2]
justice charges in this circumstance are ridiculous. GRACE: Michael Zeldin? ZELDIN:	Well	, I agree that you have to make your client likable. And that that was failure in this case. I	[2]
her on television. And I think she could have touched one heart on that jury. BLODGET:	Well	, we've talked a lot about why the government has done this, whether it helped them, whether it	[2]
I know. I guess I'm flattered. KING: All these people could be your father. COURIC:	Well	, believe me, to even be in that company, I don't know about you, Larry, if you still feel this	[2]
was convicted. And certainly there didn't seem to be any ulterior motive. GRACE:	Well	, that's very important, because many people have been saying Martha Stewart has been a celebrity	[2]
KING: Does this -- did you pause when you write a prescription, Dr. Hauser? HAUSER:	Well	this is very scary I think the problems are particularly severe for the less regulated	[3]
so that's the reason for the title. KING: Does it center on the disease? WILLIAMS:	Well	, it does. And I'll tell you reason why I even decided to write the book. About four weeks	[3]
to get with you on the effects of the disease. First, why did you go public? WILLIAMS:	Well	, one of the things ... KING: You didn't have to do that. WILLIAMS: When I first -- the first	[3]
a higher rate of depression than any other known medical illness KING: Why? KAPLIN:	Well	, we're just beginning to understand this. But essentially the answer to that is because of the	[3]
system on the brain. KING: So, suicide is not an improbable thought, then. KAPLIN:	Well	, unfortunately, suicide is the most devastating and lethal aspect of depression. And, again,	[3]
as Dr. Hauser said. KING: Dr. Kaplin, wouldn't that alone make you depressed? KAPLIN:	Well	, Larry, I think that it's very interesting because right now on your panel here you see a very	[3]
maximum and the most likely sentence for Martha Stewart? CHRIS PIXLEY, DEFENSE ATTORNEY:	Well	, if the judge stays with the base offense level, Nancy, the likely sentence is going to be 15 to	[3]
Christmas. (BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) KING: What's the hardest part of this ordeal? STEWART:	Well	, sort of coming -- coming to a screeching halt and having to deal with something extremely	[3]
than just one guy doing something wrong and lying, right? Affirmative action... COURIC:	Well	, I think there are a lot -- it's a very layered story. It's not only about the anatomy of a liar	[3]
I guess if you had -- ever would do plastic surgery, you'd do it on television? COURIC:	Well	, I don't know about that. I don't know if I would, a, do plastic surgery or if I would do it on	[3]
cancer. You got very involved. Isn't that	Well	, I'm sort of like a nagging fish	[3]

history? Why do you stay so involved? COURIC:		wife with the rolling pin. KING: Here she comes again.	
And I understand it's a political season. It's hard to win an election by telling people,	well	, your job's going overseas, too bad, buck up. But that's really the truth. Jobs are going to go	[4]
head to another. And then there is the affirmative action issue. A lot of people said	well	this is because of affirmative action that he was promoted so quickly. He, Jason Blair himself,	[4]
that people are applauding, going, Oh, she's 85, because she hates that whole idea of,	Well	, you're doing well for 85. You know what? She's doing well for any age. I don't know anybody	[4]
it is to Mel Gibson to read these reviews and the critics who keep saying things like,	Well	, the movie is very negative. It's all about the last 12 hours. Yes, that's the movie he was	[4]
you make it really hard for us. And I said, what are you talking about? And she went,	well	, because, you know, my husband came to me a couple of weeks ago and he said, now, why aren't you	[4]
a prescription. And in this state, they recognize compassionate care, and understand that,	well	, it may not work for everybody. It works for some. And so, a doctor -- under doctor's care,	[4]
go to bed. Like, your life is over. It's done. KING: No kidding. DAVIS: And I said,	well	, like for how long? I said, a week, or whatever. They said, just forever, you know, you can	[4]
on my mother for being a perfectionist. KING: Why do you call her Big Martha? STEWART:	Well	, she was Big Martha, she was in control, she was it. KOSTYRA: Sort of a nickname that stuck.	[5]
pleasure. Welcome. What do you mean by that title? MONTEL WILLIAMS, TALK SHOW HOST:	Well	, you know, it's really funny. This book is now on the "New York Times" bestseller list. It's	[5]
to explain what this is without being too technical what it is, ... WILLIAMS: Sure.	Well	, you know, ... KING: ... what happens in the body. WILLIAMS: Yes. KING: But I want to get	[5]
never talk about it to anybody. KING: Can't they give you strong painkillers? WILLIAMS:	Well	, you know, at that point in time, they were giving me pain medication. And this is what -- this	[5]
people in America suffering ... KING: Why is (UNINTELLIGIBLE) number? WILLIAMS:	Well	, you know, this disease has been considered an orphan disease for the last 20 years. And under	[5]
No, they do not have MS. And ... KING: But they might get it, though, right? WILLIAMS:	Well	, you know, we still to the day, doctors are still saying that it is not hereditary. I would say	[5]
KING: Some people end up in wheelchairs. What's your biggest fear, Mark? BARONDESS:	Well	, obviously, the wheelchair is a pretty horrible thing to think about. There's not a time that I	[5]
yet, but I plan on it very soon. KING: Would you testify? DAVIS: Yes. KING: Yes.	Well	it's obviously why they're so aware of this and they appear in other areas not to be aware.	[5]
GRACE: Speaking of what went down	well	wishers parading in and out of the	[5]

in the courtroom, there was a series of high profile		courtroom, for instance Barbara Walters, of course, Bill	
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) LARRY KING, HOST: What's the hardest part of this ordeal? STEWART:	Well	, sort of kind of coming to a screeching halt and having to deal with something extremely	[5]
Martha Stewart convicted on all counts. Final thoughts, Chris Pixley? PIXLEY:	Well	, just to finish, one thought. When a juror says this is a victory for the little guy, it reminds	[5]
the jury. GRACE: And finally, Dominick Dunne. DUNNE: And finally, Dominick Dunne.	Well	, you know, I agree with Susan. I wish she had taken the stand. I think she could have absolutely	[5]
us -- Michael Jackson. If you give this interview, we'll give you your special. COURIC:	Well	, obviously it's a very slippery slope and extremely dangerous enterprise. It's no secret that	[5]
4 and there were very few treatment alternatives. KING: There are now? COURIC: Now,	well	Avastin just got approved by the FDA. That is an anti-angiogenesis drug where they cut off the	[5]
only to lung cancer. KING: If you catch it late, you're in big trouble. COURIC:	Well	, it's very, very difficult. KING: Tell me about the Jay Monahan Center for Gastrointestinal	[5]
Show." KING: You wouldn't buy a $75 treadmill. Where did that come from? COURIC:	Well	, you know, that's another example of how gossipy stuff gets repeated and gets in the main	[5]
I feel... KING: I've gotten into a few halls of fame, there's nothing like it. COURIC:	Well	, I just feel so -- I think it's just unbelievable. And I feel so privileged that I, you know,	[5]
going overseas. Kerry said you can't really stop a lot of it. MAHER: Right, outsourcing.	Well	, that's -- there's been some pandering on his part also, as well as from Mr. Edwards. And I	[5]
KING: Before we take our calls, your take on Martha Stewart. The jury is out. MAHER: Yes.	Well	I was amused at the defense's proposition that Martha Stewart and her broker could not be	[6]
gay marriage issue and what kind of role it's going to play in the campaign? MAHER:	Well	, first off, I think it's so ironic that gays have probably planned every big, elaborate wedding	[6]
he was crucified, but all those beatings, they say, it's not in the Scripture. MAHER:	Well	, first of all, the Scripture is not gospel. People think Gospel means the truth because they use	[6]
Monahan Center for Gastrointestinal Health opening this month at Cornell Weill. COURIC:	Well	, I established a National Colorectal Research Alliance a number of years ago and we raised $18	[6]
Garr. Did it on this program, under your urging, Nancy, is that how it happened? DAVIS:	Well	for many years she had MS and was sort of in denial that she had MS and ever since she came out	[6]
different conflicting accounts. DOMINICK DUNNE, FRIEND OF STEWART, IN COURTROOM TODAY:	Well	, I think Henry and I agreed totally. There was no reaction from her. She was looking straight	[6]
DUNNE: This wasn't -- you know, and	Well	, long story short, to you, Michael	[6]

it was presented as a kind of bitchy line. GRACE:		Zeldin, did this turn into a issue of who went home Miss	
women's federal penitentiary? What is a day in the life for Martha Stewart? MCDOUGAL:	Well	, every visitor she has, if it is her daughter, her minister, every single visitor, she will be	[6]
of that administration and the way they think. That greed is good. You can buy everybody.	Well	, I think this shows that you can't buy everybody. They don't care about the money. They care	[7]
there and that's what the pain's coming from. Stop lifting weights and you'll be OK.	Well	, I stopped lifting weights, but the natural progression of the disease was that it would go into	[7]
marijuana. And I wrote about it in my book. KING: Can you legally get it? WILLIAMS:	Well	, you can in the state of California, for a prescription. And in this state, they recognize	[7]
it. And they explained why he didn't reveal it. WILLIAMS: That's right. That's right.	Well	, maybe I could be. I don't know. KING: Do you feel it's going to be cured? WILLIAMS: I think	[7]
finger. It makes no sense. None. KING: What do the insurance companies say? WILLIAMS:	Well	, we're still trying to get an answer for that one. But I think one of the things that's so	[7]
bill. In fact I didn't know it kicked in right away. I thought it's 2006. BARONDESS:	Well	you know this continual urge that people will -- and I hate to be partisan here but with the	[7]
They chose for her to enact her right to remain silent. Mistake? ZELDIN:	Well	, after the fact of a guilty verdict, of course it's a mistake. But it's hard to know without	[7]
Congeniality and it ended up costing Martha Stewart time behind federal bars? ZELDIN:	Well	, no, I don't think this was a Miss Congeniality contest. I think that you always learn, as a	[7]
anything wrong. STEWART: Exactly. KING: So that's got to drive you berserk. STEWART:	Well	, but that -- having done nothing wrong allows you to sleep, allows you... GRACE: It does?	[7]
you think that was giving her a break, or the feds felt they couldn't prove it? ZELDIN:	Well	, you can argue it either way. They proved what they needed to prove pretty simply and pretty	[7]
to approve it, and immediately Waksal and others started dropping their stock in Imclone.	Well	, guess what, during the trial, Erbutux was approved. As we go to break, take a listen to what	[7]
OK, I'm wrong. I think this jury... KING: You think the public expects her to... TRUMP:	Well	, not the public. The jury. Right now, it doesn't matter what the public thinks. It matters what	[7]
then live on the "Today Show." We have the first primetime. How did you get it? COURIC:	Well	, you know, I wasn't all that involved in getting this interview. I wasn't. I have to give credit	[7]
life threatening disease. KING: It's the word you can hear, you have cancer. COURIC:	Well	, you know, not always. And there's a lot of hope for people out there with different cancers, so	[7]
Maher read on John Kerry winning it all? BILL MAHER, HBO'S "REAL TIME WITH BILL MAHER":	Well	, we have an eight- month election now, Larry. That can't be good for us. It can't be good --	[7]

the board for their team -- gay marriage... MAHER: How well will Kerry hold up? MAHER:	Well	, I don't know. It depends on -- a lot of it depends on whether people are still scared by this	[7]
he had just been honest about Iraq, if he had just said, Look, it's a Texas thing. KING:	Well	, but maybe he had the wrong information. MAHER: It's a Texas thing. They tried to get my daddy,	[7]
thank you so much. KING: I know how close you are to your mom. How old is she? MAHER:	Well	, she probably doesn't want me to say, but you know... KING: OK. We won't say. MAHER: You	[7]
flags to get the verdict out. So I think that's actually what we were seeing. GRACE:	Well	, they looked pretty darn happy to me! BLODGET: We didn't -- yes, we didn't see any of that	[8]
cancer. KING: That's the killer that once you have it, it's hard to... COURIC:	Well	, it's very difficult. Although there is the Whipple procedure (ph). And some candidates are	[8]
optimistic and they have to be an advocate and out there advocating the research. KING:	Well	it's a true optimism or is it you have to be optimistic? BARONDESS: I believe that I'm going to	[9]
that wanted to import drugs from -- from Canada instead of through Canada... KING:	Well	isn't there a way to check that the drug was made by Pfizer and is in the Pfizer box?	[9]
improve the immune system and make it less aggressive and have beneficial effects on MS as	well	. KING: And do a lot of research I bet. HAUSER: Yes. WILLIAMS: Dr. Hauser has also done	[0]
is the substance that insulates nerve cells and lets the nerve cells in our brain work	well	. KING: So it can affect one person in the arm, another person in the leg and another person	[0]
is the treatment that is most often used it's called Taxon (ph) is used very commonly, as	well	. KING: And what does that do? HAUSER: It's a great help to many people with MS, but it's	[0]
that Stewart was probably smarter than all the lawyers put together and could hold up very	well	on cross-examination. They chose for her to enact her right to remain silent. Mistake?	[0]
with that. But clearly, Morvillo, who's a terrific lawyer, knew better his client and how	well	she would fare under cross-examination from very good prosecutors. GRACE: Chris Pixley, what	[0]
returns have a lie on there somewhere. But why Martha Stewart? Michael Zeldin, you know as	well	as I do that insider trading is endemic within the system. My cousin's brother told me this. My	[0]
if it was a wrong decision. And Susan seems to reflect it is. And I'm suggesting, as	well	, that, looking back, clearly, she had no opportunity to present who she was to this jury. And	[0]
with that. KING: Not defensive? COURIC: You know, he wasn't. I think he knows full	well	that he has done something that is terribly wrong and terribly amoral. And I think he does	[0]
I also think there's something to be	well	as the right thing. If we had to	[0]

learned from people who do the wrong things as		limit our interviews to everybody who was doing good and	
very differently. Now when I read things about people, I know that it could very	well	be a distortion, that it's being written so the writer can be snarky about something, or that	[0]
that they're trying to get up on the board for their team -- gay marriage... MAHER: How	well	will Kerry hold up? MAHER: Well, I don't know. It depends on -- a lot of it depends on whether	[0]
most liberal senator in the Senate. And I saw in the debate that you moderated -- and very	well	, I might add... MAHER: Thank you. MAHER: ... that John Kerry is not going to probably	[0]
applauding, going, Oh, she's 85, because she hates that whole idea of, Well, you're doing	well	for 85. You know what? She's doing well for any age. I don't know anybody who's as sharp as she	[0]
she hates that whole idea of, Well, you're doing well for 85. You know what? She's doing	well	for any age. I don't know anybody who's as sharp as she is. So happy birthday, Mom. KING:	[0]
MAHER: Right, outsourcing. Well, that's -- there's been some pandering on his part also, as	well	as from Mr. Edwards. And I understand it's a political season. It's hard to win an election by	[0]
OK, what I really don't understand is if they get Osama bin Laden, whey does that reflect	well	on the president? Why should he get reelected for that? It's the military's victory. I mean, if	[0]
KING: Well, I know this wasn't easy for you, Martha, and I appreciate you coming. STEWART:	Well	, I love coming to talk to you and to see you and to bring you cakes and... KING: It's	[?]
always talk about how the fact that we want passion and sincerity and honesty in a movie.	Well	, from this artist, that is what you get in this movie. And anyone who says he did it for money	[?]