Missed Constitutional Moments and Real Constitutional Conflicts in Hungary 1989 v. 2011
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Date
2022
Authors
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Journal ISSN
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Publisher
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek
Abstract
This paper, examining the Hungarian example argues that that the price is high if a constitutional
moment to adopt a constitution based on wide societal compromise has been
missed. The constitution-making process might then be completed either by activist
courts or by activist political forces. Hungary experienced two major constitutional reforms,
both missing a consensual constitutional momentum. The first transformation in
1989–90, which replaced the socialist authoritarian system by democracy, was brought
about by political elites, lacking democratic legitimacy, keeping the formal legal framework
of the socialist constitution. The second reform in 2011 brought a formally new
constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary), initiated and adopted solely by the governing
party (FIDESZ) with a constitutional majority, without consensus. The Constitutional
Court both times attempted to play an active, corrective role in the aftermath
of the constitution-making.