Ethnic conciliation in parliaments
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Date
2021
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Publisher
Akadémiai Kiadó
Abstract
A common feature of the present-day constitutions of the Western Balkans is the effort to solve conflicts of
ethnic character using predominantly legal tools, mostly in a parliamentarian way. However, the practice
shows that most legal regimes based on instruments that give preference to the interests of one or more
equally strong ethnic groups can be built mostly to the detriment of democratic states. Effective and
functional state institutions and ethnic power-sharing in multi-ethnic states seem to be in conflict with each
other. Rule-of-law-based models can only function properly if parties have mutual trust and can solve their
internal conflicts through compromises among themselves. Political agreements based on mutual trust are
more effective in the long term as legal instruments. There are examples of such arrangements in multiethnic
states of Western Europe (Belgium, Northern Ireland, and Switzerland). Analysis of the solutions of
the Western Balkans countries and their comparison with these Western examples shows clearly that hard
legal tools (vetoes) do not soften but sharpen conflicts, while informal arrangements based on mutual trust
are more productive.