Ethnic conciliation in parliaments

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dc.contributor.authorSzabó Zsolt
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-22T16:34:37Z
dc.date.available2024-02-22T16:34:37Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractA common feature of the present-day constitutions of the Western Balkans is the effort to solve conflicts of ethnic character using predominantly legal tools, mostly in a parliamentarian way. However, the practice shows that most legal regimes based on instruments that give preference to the interests of one or more equally strong ethnic groups can be built mostly to the detriment of democratic states. Effective and functional state institutions and ethnic power-sharing in multi-ethnic states seem to be in conflict with each other. Rule-of-law-based models can only function properly if parties have mutual trust and can solve their internal conflicts through compromises among themselves. Political agreements based on mutual trust are more effective in the long term as legal instruments. There are examples of such arrangements in multiethnic states of Western Europe (Belgium, Northern Ireland, and Switzerland). Analysis of the solutions of the Western Balkans countries and their comparison with these Western examples shows clearly that hard legal tools (vetoes) do not soften but sharpen conflicts, while informal arrangements based on mutual trust are more productive.
dc.identifier.issn2560-1067
dc.identifier.issn2498-5473
dc.identifier.mtmt32868867
dc.identifier.urihttps://krepozit.kre.hu/handle/123456789/808
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAkadémiai Kiadó
dc.relation.ispartofseriesHUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES; 3
dc.titleEthnic conciliation in parliaments
dc.title.alternativeWestern Balkans v. Western Europe
dc.typeArticle
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