Közjogi Intézet

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Browsing Közjogi Intézet by Author "Szabó Zsolt"

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    A reformátorok királytükre
    (Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, 2018) Szabó Zsolt
    Tanulmányom három részből áll: először a protestáns, elsősorban református teológia államfelfogásának elemeit mutatom be általánosságban,1 majd egy 16. századi magyar református szerző, Pataki Füsüs János munkája alapján az ideális uralkodó képét Bethlen Gábor református fejedelem ábrázolásában az első magyar nyelven íródott államelméleti mű kapcsán, végül a modernitás időszakából egy gyakorló református államférfi, a modernitás-kritikus Abraham Kuyper holland miniszterelnök munkásságát idézem fel röviden.
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    Ethnic conciliation in parliaments
    (Akadémiai Kiadó, 2021) Szabó Zsolt
    A common feature of the present-day constitutions of the Western Balkans is the effort to solve conflicts of ethnic character using predominantly legal tools, mostly in a parliamentarian way. However, the practice shows that most legal regimes based on instruments that give preference to the interests of one or more equally strong ethnic groups can be built mostly to the detriment of democratic states. Effective and functional state institutions and ethnic power-sharing in multi-ethnic states seem to be in conflict with each other. Rule-of-law-based models can only function properly if parties have mutual trust and can solve their internal conflicts through compromises among themselves. Political agreements based on mutual trust are more effective in the long term as legal instruments. There are examples of such arrangements in multiethnic states of Western Europe (Belgium, Northern Ireland, and Switzerland). Analysis of the solutions of the Western Balkans countries and their comparison with these Western examples shows clearly that hard legal tools (vetoes) do not soften but sharpen conflicts, while informal arrangements based on mutual trust are more productive.
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    Missed Constitutional Moments and Real Constitutional Conflicts in Hungary 1989 v. 2011
    (Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek, 2022) Szabó Zsolt
    This paper, examining the Hungarian example argues that that the price is high if a constitutional moment to adopt a constitution based on wide societal compromise has been missed. The constitution-making process might then be completed either by activist courts or by activist political forces. Hungary experienced two major constitutional reforms, both missing a consensual constitutional momentum. The first transformation in 1989–90, which replaced the socialist authoritarian system by democracy, was brought about by political elites, lacking democratic legitimacy, keeping the formal legal framework of the socialist constitution. The second reform in 2011 brought a formally new constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary), initiated and adopted solely by the governing party (FIDESZ) with a constitutional majority, without consensus. The Constitutional Court both times attempted to play an active, corrective role in the aftermath of the constitution-making.
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    Parlament
    (HVG-ORAC, 2022) Szabó Zsolt